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ARTICLES 
Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden Pocketbook 
JOHN BROOKS,* BRIAN GALLE,** & BRENDAN MAHER*** 
Governments can use regulation to pay for public goods out of 
the pockets of consumers rather than taxpayers. For example, the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) underwrites care for women and the infirm 
through higher insurance premium payments by healthy men. Building 
on a classic article from Richard Posner, we show that these “cross- 
subsidies” between consumers are a common feature of modern law, 
ranging from telecommunications to intellectual property to employee 
benefits. 
Critics of the ACA, and even some of its supporters, argue that taxes 
would be a better choice. Taxes are said to be more transparent and to fit 
better with the recommendations of public finance economics. We show 
how these same arguments can be extended to many other contemporary 
cross-subsidies. 
We also argue, however, that the critics may well be wrong. 
Drawing on recent theoretical and empirical advances, we show that 
cross-subsidies can be more efficient than taxes, especially when they 
are used to redistribute wealth on grounds other than income, such as 
the ACA’s transfer from men to women. We then apply our analysis to 
several key contemporary cross-subsidies, including personal injury 
law, patents, class action lawsuits, paid family leave, and, of course, 
the ACA.   
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INTRODUCTION 
What does the Affordable Care Act (ACA) have in common with local tele-
phone service? What common factor unites tort law and net neutrality? Patents 
and paid family leave? Higher education financing and postal deliveries? The an-
swer in all cases is that lawmakers have chosen to use cross-subsidies rather than 
general tax revenues as a way to underwrite their chosen policy goals. A cross- 
subsidy arises when two similar consumers of a good pay different prices—or, 
equivalently, when two consumers impose different costs on a service provider 
but are charged the same price—and the excess funds from one are used to make 
up the shortfall for the other.1 Cross-subsidies, in other words, are a way of pay-
ing for public goods out of the pockets of consumers (or other private actors) 
rather than taxpayers.2 
Although cross-subsidies are a pervasive phenomenon, scholarly analysis of 
them is not.3 Some fundamental principles of public finance economics suggest 
that cross-subsidies are usually the wrong policy choice. Though this is a point 
that has been made recently by critics of the ACA, it has yet to be extended to all 
the other modern instances in which the legal system relies on cross-subsidies.4 
1. See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 
966, 968–69 (1975). 
2. See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22, 23–24 (1971). 
3. Leading public finance economists have noted this gap. See, e.g., Raj Chetty & Amy Finkelstein, 
Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 111, 185 (Alan J. 
Auerbach et al. eds., 2013); Amy Finkelstein et al., Redistribution by Insurance Market Regulation: 
Analyzing a Ban on Gender-Based Retirement Annuities, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 38, 54 (2009) (“[W]hy 
insurance markets rather than, say, the tax system, are a natural locus for . . . transfers . . . warrant[s] 
discussion and research.”). 
4. By far our closest antecedent is Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax 
Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157 (2003). Logue and Avraham consider whether 
insurers should be permitted to price according to an insured’s genetic information, as well as whether 
the tort system should include compensation for pain and suffering damages. See id. at 208–48. In both 
these contexts, their analysis centers on whether the government should use “pooling” or “cross- 
subsidization,” to redistribute or whether it should instead use the “tax-and-transfer system.” Id. at 248– 
49. We build on their key insight that redistribution based on factors that do not correlate with incentives 
to work will function differently than redistribution based on income. See id. at 169. We also expand the 
discussion to cover many other legal contexts and work in a variety of other analytic considerations, 
such as the last fifteen years of development in the public finance economics literature. 
Somewhat further removed from our analysis, Yoram Margalioth argues that cross-subsidies can have 
tax-like effects on efficiency and that these should be compared to the impacts of a formal tax 
alternative, without exploring closely how that comparison should be made. See Yoram Margalioth, The 
Many Faces of Mandates: Beyond Traditional Accommodation Mandates and Other Classic Cases, 40 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 648–49 (2003). 
Even further are scholars who acknowledge that redistribution can be effected through either taxes or 
cross-subsidies, but do not analyze which option is superior, Christine Jolls, Law and the Labor Market, 
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Our first goal, therefore, is to identify the many legal rules that essentially dupli-
cate the ACA’s underlying structure. 
We also want to show, however, that the criticism directed at the ACA’s cross- 
subsidy system is far too simple in most cases. A more nuanced understanding 
of the economics of cross-subsidies reveals that there are times when cross-subsi-
dies are at least defensible and sometimes the best policy choice. That said, for all 
their commonalities, policies that rely on cross-subsidies can also differ in impor-
tant ways. Thus, our second, larger goal is to encourage lawmakers to consider 
the pros and cons of cross-subsidies, in all their complexity, for each policy that 
relies on them. We begin that process by analyzing a handful of cross-subsidies 
with the new array of tools we lay out. 
This is the big picture of our argument; let us now say a bit more about the 
details. Because it is helpful to be concrete, we focus our analysis on the ACA, 
which is probably the example most familiar to our readers. Critics of the ACA 
suggest that the law inefficiently relies on cross-subsidies rather than on general 
tax revenues.5 What kind of cross-subsidies does the ACA use? For one, the ACA 
requires insurers to cover everyone who applies for insurance, regardless of how 
expensive it will be to cover any particular person.6 And, with a couple of excep-
tions, an insurer must charge everyone in a given plan the same rate, even if it 
expects that any one member of the pool is likely to cost more.7 The result, on av-
erage, is that customers likely to have high healthcare costs will pay less than 
they would have in the absence of the ACA.8 For example, early ACA data report 
that premiums for women of childbearing age are relatively cheaper than before 
the Act.9 
2 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 359, 376 (2006) [hereinafter Jolls, Labor Market]; Christine Jolls, 
Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 250 (2000) [hereinafter Jolls, Accommodation]; 
Pierre Picard, Natural Disaster Insurance and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off, 75 J. RISK & INS. 17, 23 
(2008); Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Anti-Discrimination, Accommodation and Universal Mandates— 
Aren’t They All the Same?, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 134–36 (2003); or offer only passing 
analysis, Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 
195, 210–11 (2014) (explaining insurance antidiscrimination laws may be preferable because the 
desired transfer occurs without the distortion of individuals’ incentives that is typical of income tax 
redistribution); Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 63–65 
(2005) (arguing that all of society should pay for family leave because all of society benefits). 
5. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Fixing Obamacare: The Virtues of Choice, 
Competition, and Deregulation, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 493, 514–15 (2013). 
6. See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1588 (2011). 
7. Id. at 1589–90. 
8. Cf. id. at 1602. 
9. See Kevin Quealy & Margot Sanger-Katz, Obama’s Health Law: Who Was Helped Most, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/29/upshot/obamacare-who-was- 
helped-most.html [https://nyti.ms/2jTIQmu]. 
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But if the pool is to break even, this means that premiums for everyone 
else in the pool are now relatively more expensive. In other words, the ACA 
finances the healthcare of young women and families in part by collecting higher 
insurance premiums from single men and women not of childbearing age. 
Most economists view this structure as an unfortunate choice, albeit one that 
was perhaps driven by political necessity.10 Their objection, however, is not to 
the decision to support women’s health, but instead to how that choice was paid 
for. The basic argument is that it would have been more economically efficient to 
allow insurers to charge an actuarially fair price11—that is, to let women pay 
more—but have the government later write checks to women to make up the dif-
ference. We call this alternative approach the “tax-and-transfer” method. 
The putative superiority of tax and transfer over cross-subsidies rests on two 
central theories from the public finance and law-and-economics literatures. The 
first theory, sometimes known as the “double-distortion” argument, derives from 
a key 1976 work by economists Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz.12 
Atkinson and Stiglitz show that, in many situations, it is inefficient for the gov-
ernment to impose a differentiated consumption tax, a tax on consumer goods 
whose rate varies by the product purchased.13 The intuition is simple: such a tax 
distorts consumers’ choices about what to buy, whereas many alternatives, such 
as the income tax, do not.14 Although the income tax has its own unwanted 
effects, such as potentially reducing workers’ incentives to earn income, 
Atkinson and Stiglitz show that consumption taxes also have these same 
unwanted effects. Thus, they argue, that the differentiated consumption tax is 
always at least as bad as, and usually worse than, an income tax. 
The second central result is that taxes, and risks of loss more generally, should 
be spread as widely as possible across the potential taxpaying public. Doing so 
allows taxes to be imposed at lower rates and, therefore, to have less impact on 
the economy. Cross-subsidies seem to violate both these prescriptions. By charg-
ing groups with low healthcare costs, such as healthy young men, more than they 
would otherwise pay, the ACA imposes a sales tax on young men’s purchase of 
healthcare.15 We could instead spread the costs around and collect a much smaller 
amount from each taxpayer by switching to a tax-and-transfer system. Doing so 
could limit the negative effects of the higher sales tax on young men while still 
raising enough revenue to fund women’s health. We could say much the same 
10. See, e.g., Roger Feldman & Bryan E. Dowd, Biased Selection—Fairness and Efficiency in Health 
Insurance Markets, in AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR REFORM 64, 75–79 (Robert B. 
Helms ed., 1993); Alan B. Krueger, Observations on Employment-Based Government Mandates, with 
Particular Reference to Health Insurance 36 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Sec., Working Paper No. 
323, 1993); see also Jerry Hausman, Taxation by Telecommunications Regulation, in 12 TAX POLICY 
AND THE ECONOMY 29, 41–42 (James M. Poterba ed., 1998) (critiquing U.S. telecommunications policy 
on this basis); Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Cross-Employee Redistribution Effects of Employee Mandated 
Benefits, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 311, 311 (2003). 
11. In insurance lingo, a premium is “actuarially fair” if the total premiums paid equal the expected 
value of any payments from the insurer. In expectation and on average, the transaction would be a wash, 
even though a given insured might receive more or less than she paid in. 
12. A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J. 
PUB. ECON. 55 (1976). 
13. Id. at 68. 
14. LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 123–24 (2008). 
15. See Krueger, supra note 10, at 20–21 (explaining potential labor distortions of health insurance 
mandate). 
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about any number of other government policies.16 Net neutrality rules shift some 
of the cost of heavy Internet users onto low-intensity subscribers. Modern student 
loan programs shift some of the cost of educating public interest lawyers onto 
corporate law partners. Product liability torts shift some of the cost of paying for 
harms inflicted on the most vulnerable purchasers to other purchasers who are at 
less risk.17 Each of these subsidies could instead be paid for with tax and 
transfer.18 
Although this standard narrative suggests that tax and transfer is superior to 
cross-subsidization, the practical realities of these systems are not so simple. In 
several important instances, the assumptions that underlie the double-distortion 
and tax-spreading arguments might not hold. In many cases, we find that cross- 
subsidies can be justified at least some of the time, as we illustrate with a series of 
real-world examples. 
We see four key reasons why cross-subsidies can sometimes be the best choice, 
economically speaking. The first two have been recognized already in the litera-
ture, though we provide some important corrections and complications; the sec-
ond two are mostly new. 
First, there can be times when a cross-subsidy works as a better income tax 
than the income tax itself—that is, the cross-subsidy is better than the traditional 
income-tax system at identifying taxpayers with a higher ability to pay, or is able 
to do so with fewer distortions and bad incentives. 
Second, cross-subsidies can serve as a kind of “benefit” tax, in which people 
willingly bear a cost because it is the only way they can get something they want. 
This argument is based on a well-known 1989 paper by Lawrence Summers.19 
We show, however, that Summers and most of the literature that follows neglect 
parts of both the Atkinson–Stiglitz and risk-spreading arguments we just men-
tioned, so his claims may apply less widely than is usually understood. 
Third, cross-subsidies may be a way of rooting out “inframarginal” beneficia-
ries of government transfers—people who would have engaged in an activity the 
government wants to subsidize even without a subsidy. By reducing the amount 
spent on these beneficiaries, cross-subsidies help to shrink the total amount of the 
bill imposed on individuals. 
Fourth, cross-subsidies can operate as a kind of “hidden tax.” Others have men-
tioned the hidden features of cross-subsidies but only in the context of arguing 
that such features make cross-subsidies easier to enact.20 We show that the 
16. See Posner, supra note 2, at 23–24 (discussing the impact of subsidies as part of numerous 
government policies). 
17. Logue & Avraham, supra note 4, at 229. 
18. For example, in New Zealand, the government compensates tort victims directly. See Peter H. 
Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 190 (2008). 
19. See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 
177, 181 (1989). 
20. Most notoriously, the ACA architect Jonathan Gruber has joked that cross-subsidies work 
politically because of the “stupidity of the American voter.” See Jose A. DelReal, Obamacare 
Consultant Under Fire for ‘Stupidity of the American Voter’ Comment, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2014, 
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2:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/11/11/obamacare-consultant- 
under-fire-for-stupidity-of-the-american-voter-comment [https://perma.cc/WGH2-MRZH]; see also 
Krueger, supra note 10, at 3 (“The costs of mandates are hidden, which makes them politically 
feasible.”). 
21. Faulhaber, supra note 1, at 968–69. This assumes that the good or service is functionally the same 
across the pool; if, for example, the good being sold to the transferees is really a worse good, then the 
price adjustment is attributable to quality, not a subsidy. H. Cremer et al., Universal Service: An 
Economic Perspective, 72 ANNALS PUB. & COOP. ECON. 5, 11–12 (2001). Further, as Faulhaber shows, 
in some cases adding new customers allows fixed costs to be spread over more payors; even if these new 
payors are charged less, there is no cross-subsidy so long as their inclusion in the pool reduces costs to 
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opacity of cross-subsidies is not only politically useful but also more efficient in 
some cases. 
Continuing with the ACA, our primary example, we can see these effects at 
work to some degree. First, the ACA is a better income tax than the formal 
income tax because, rather than taxing only those with high income, the ACA’s 
cross-subsidy structure imposes some costs on those with good health; it is, essen-
tially, a health tax rather than an income tax. This mitigates some of the poten-
tially negative effects of income taxation because individuals are less likely—and 
less able—to manipulate their health than their taxable incomes. In addition, as 
we will explain, using multiple tax (and tax-like) instruments can tax the ability 
to earn income more effectively than a formal income tax alone. Second, the 
ACA has some advantages of a benefit tax: although the mandate to buy health in-
surance is analogous to a tax, it comes with the benefits of insurance, and thus 
any negative effects are further mitigated. Last, there is a salience aspect of the 
ACA in that, for all the political pain of its enactment, it was probably easier to 
pass than a single-payer tax-and-transfer alternative. Moreover, the degree of 
redistribution within the program is still somewhat opaque, again mitigating the 
distortion of a redistributive income tax. 
We expand on these and other points below. In Part I we explain more about 
what cross-subsidies are and provide the standard economic argument against 
them. Part II complicates the story by showing that policymakers have used 
cross-subsidies frequently, and across a number of different policy spaces. 
Demonstrating the ubiquity of cross-subsidization is one of the contributions of 
this Article. If cross-subsidies are an inferior policy instrument, why are they so 
common? Part III answers this question by presenting our four reasons why 
cross-subsidies can work well and may even be superior to tax and transfer. Part 
IV applies these insights in short case studies, including the ACA, paid family 
leave laws, intellectual property incentives, tort payments for pain and suffering, 
and class action lawsuits. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. WHAT IS A CROSS-SUBSIDY? 
A cross-subsidy exists when, within a pool of people (most often consumers), 
one segment of the pool pays more than they would pay outside the pool so that 
another segment of the pool pays less than they would pay outside the pool.21 The 
former group are “transferors” (or “payors”); the latter are “transferees” (or “pay-
ees”). The key is that prices paid by the transferors effectively subsidize the trans-
ferees.22 Although with most cross-subsidies everyone in the pool pays the same 
price, that does not have to be the case; strictly speaking, a cross-subsidy involves 
any situation in which one pool segment pays more than it would outside the pool 
so that another segment pays less.23 
Cross-subsidies have some well-known manifestations—a few of which we 
will discuss shortly—but are for the most part undertheorized. Absent some mar-
ket failure or regulation, the presumption is that cross-subsidies will quickly van-
ish because transferors will refuse to pay an inflated price.24 Although that is 
mostly true, there are still many instances in which market irregularities or 
regulation—often regulation enacted for some purpose other than to create a 
cross-subsidy—operate to sustain cross-subsidies. 
In contemporary times, the best-known examples of cross-subsidies are in 
health insurance markets. Asymmetric information and adverse selection make it 
extremely difficult for insurers to sell actuarially fair policies in an open market.25 
Those most likely to seek insurance are those most likely to use it, and because of 
natural and legal limits on the ability of insurers to underwrite, that reality makes 
it difficult to properly price a policy for any one individual.26 Insurers protect 
themselves by charging higher premiums, but those premiums drive away the 
lower-risk individuals, and quickly the insurance market breaks down.27 We 
oversimplify, but that is the gist. 
One solution is the public provision of health care (or, relatedly, health insur-
ance), which the United States does with respect to the elderly, poor, and disabled 
populations through Medicare and Medicaid. For everyone else, the nation relies 
on cross-subsidies to make private insurance work.28 
For employed persons (and their dependents), the law aims to make the insur-
ance purchasing unit the employee group.29 Groups reduce risk variance and 
the initial payors by more than the incremental cost of providing service to the newcomer. Faulhaber, 
supra note 1, at 968–70. 
22. In contrast, a direct government subsidy is one in which public funds are used to lower the prices 
paid by one group without any direct effect on the price paid by those in any other group. 
23. Faulhaber, supra note 1, at 968–70. 
24. Gerald R. Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidy Analysis with More than Two Services, 1 J. COMPETITION L. 
& ECON. 441, 442 (2005); Posner, supra note 2, at 29. 
25. See Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance and the Labor Market, in 1A HANDBOOK OF HEALTH 
ECONOMICS 645, 651 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000); Brendan S. Maher, 
Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1257, 1280–81 (2016). 
26. Brendan S. Maher, Unlocking Exchanges, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 125, 128–30, 145 (2017). 
27. See id. at 129. 
28. Cross-subsidies often exist in insurance markets, but they are most prominent in the health 
insurance context. When insurance uses perfect experience rating—in other words, charging each 
insured based on the insured’s own risk factors—there would be no cross-subsidy. But insurance rarely 
uses perfect experience rating because doing so is difficult and because it would probably make the 
overall market smaller than it would be using hidden cross-subsidies. Thus, some level of cross-subsidy 
occurs in many insurance or quasi-insurance settings. 
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001a (2012). 
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make underwriting easier. The larger the group, the closer the group risk comes 
to matching the community risk—the risk an average member of the community 
would present. Because community risk is, actuarially speaking, easy to deter-
mine,30 so is the risk for large groups. This system uses a cross-subsidy to create a 
stable insurance market; some employees, on their own, would be highly risky 
insureds who would pay higher rates on their own rather than the group rate; 
others would be low-risk insureds who would pay lower rates. The group rate is 
thus a cross-subsidy from the low-risk members of the pool to the high-risk 
members. 
Much of the hysteria associated with the ACA stemmed from its effort to use 
cross-subsidies in the non-group market. Two of the ACA’s central reforms were 
its requirements that health insurance be both guaranteed and made available 
without underwriting—that is, at community rates. The problem with the ACA’s 
reforms, however, is that no insurance company could survive if it wrote policies 
on such unfavorable terms. The pool of people that would buy insurance under 
those circumstances are those who are already sick or most likely to become sick. 
In contrast, the incentive for good risks to buy insurance would be extremely 
small. In other words, the resulting pool would lack a sufficient cross-subsidy to 
allow insurers to profitably sell policies at community-rated prices. The individ-
ual mandate (and associated penalty tax) was the primary regulatory means by 
which the government intended to create a non-group pool large and healthy 
enough for the cross-subsidy to permit insurers to sell into that market at commu-
nity rates. Some did not find that approach congenial.31 
30. Gruber, supra note 25, at 651. 
31. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Insurance Mandate May Be Health Bill’s Undoing, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/health/policy/insurance-mandate-may-be-health- 
bills-undoing.html [https://nyti.ms/2oDZLLF] (noting individual mandate is unpopular and “the public 
unhapp[y] over the provision”); Martha Shanahan, 5 Memorable Moments When Town Hall Meetings 
Turned to Rage, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 7, 2013, 6:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/ 
2013/08/07/209919206/5-memorable-moments-when-town-hall-meetings-turned-to-rage [https://perma.cc/ 
H35M-Q9Z4] (noting extreme reactions to ACA). 
32. Cf. Faulhaber, supra note 1, at 972 (arguing that the government must ban competition to prevent 
entrepreneurs from undercutting industries with cross-subsidies); Lynne Holt & Mary Galligan, 
Mapping the Field: Retrospective of the Federal Universal Service Programs, 37 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 
773, 774 (2013) (noting competitive disadvantages associated with cross-subsidization). For more in- 
depth analysis of when competitors not subject to cross-subsidies would enter a market to undercut the 
subsidy, see generally Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Optimal Bypass and Cream Skimming, 80 
AM. ECON. REV. 1042 (1990). 
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One might be tempted to conclude that cross-subsidies can only live in a regu-
latory regime where we compel transferors to purchase the good or service we 
seek to cross-subsidize.32 Otherwise, why would the transferors willingly submit 
to cross-subsidizing? But, although cross-subsidies are often created by mandates, 
they can and do arise in other settings. Indeed, for decades employment-based in-
surance has existed because of the underlying cross-subsidy that permits insurers 
to sell into that market, and before 2010 there was no insurance mandate of any 
kind. In other words, before 2010, no employer had any obligation to offer health 
insurance as a benefit,33 yet most employers provided health insurance regardless, 
at the demands of even their low-risk employees.34 Other employment-based 
benefits—particularly traditional pensions, which are nothing more than annuities— 
owe part of their stability and frequency to cross-subsidies at play in the em-
ployee group, again, without any mandate.35 When non-group markets are 
impaired by adverse selection or other market failures, the appeal of group par-
ticipation can overcome the pain of the cross-subsidy.36 
Furthermore, the involvement of an employer is not required. As we explain 
below, cross-subsidies appear in numerous settings, including with respect to stu-
dent loans, legal remedies, consumer bankruptcy, and quasi-public utilities. 
Cross-subsidies can arise in a variety of market and regulatory settings—far 
more, we think, than has been commonly understood. In addition, cross-subsidies 
are an interesting regulatory tool for another reason: as some of the examples we 
have noted reveal, cross-subsidies often do not involve transfers from “rich” to 
“poor” players; rather, the transfers in question are frequently orthogonal to 
wealth. A more robust theoretical treatment of cross-subsidies, therefore, will be 
broadly useful to policymakers beyond those fields in which they have most 
famously attracted attention.37 
B. THE STANDARD ECONOMIC ACCOUNT OF CROSS-SUBSIDIES IN HEALTH INSURANCE 
A number of economic commentators have argued that cross-subsidies in 
health insurance are inefficient.38 Instead, this account holds, the government 
should underwrite health insurance benefits through general tax revenues.39 That 
claim rests on two central pillars of modern public finance economics. First, gov-
ernments should not impose differentiated consumption taxes, and a cross- 
33. See David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—Origins and 
Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82–84 (2006). 
34. See id. at 84. 
35. See Michael A. Morrisey, Mandated Benefits and Compensating Differentials—Taxing the 
Uninsured, in AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY 133, 137–38 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1993). 
36. Prior to the ACA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) had for some years 
required that members of the employment group be treated equally—that is, although an insurer could 
underwrite across groups, it could not underwrite within groups. See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b) (2012) 
(enacted in 2009). A group of miners, for example, could be charged more than a group of accountants, 
but there could be no rate differentiation within each group. 
37. That is, our analysis has some common elements with, but ultimately neither agrees nor disagrees 
with, the claim that legal rules should not be used to redistribute on the basis of wealth. See Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing 
Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667–68 (1994). 
38. See, e.g., CASEY B. MULLIGAN, SIDE EFFECTS AND COMPLICATIONS: THE ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF HEALTH-CARE REFORM 174–79 (2015); Peter Diamond, Organizing the Health 
Insurance Market, 60 ECONOMETRICA 1233, 1243 (1992); Mark V. Pauly, The Welfare Economics of 
Community Rating, 37 J. RISK & INS. 407, 410 (1970); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
39. Commentators have mostly overlooked the fact that even cross-subsidies can be partly financed 
through tax revenue. Health insurance is not taxed to workers when paid by employers, see I.R.C. § 106 
(2012), and is deductible when paid by the self-employed, id. § 162(a)(l). As a result of these provisions, 
the government effectively pays a portion of the incremental costs of cross-subsidies. Cf. Morrisey, 
supra note 35, at 140 (explaining that tax exclusions are government copays for health insurance costs). 
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subsidy is essentially that.40 Second, tax burdens should be spread out over as 
many taxpayers as possible, and cross-subsidies are a tax imposed on a narrow 
base of payors.41 For readers without a deep acquaintance with public finance ec-
onomics, we address these points in greater detail in the following sections. 
1. Avoid Differentiated Consumption Taxes 
Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz, in their foundational 1976 article, set 
out the case against imposing taxes on some consumption goods but not 
others.42 In the legal literature, these arguments have come to be called the 
“double-distortion” claim,43 and are best known through the work of Louis 
Kaplow and Steven Shavell.44 The claim begins with the premise that, though 
taxes distort private decisions to some degree, the most efficient tax system is one 
that minimizes these distortions.45 For example, taxes imposed on the products of 
our labor, such as the income tax, tend to discourage work by reducing the after- 
tax payoff to those labors. 
A key premise on which Atkinson and Stiglitz rely is that the government can-
not escape these labor distortions even if it nominally imposes its tax on the pur-
chase of goods rather than on labor itself.46 The reason is that, for the most part, 
we do not want money for its own sake, but rather because it allows us to buy 
other things.47 Taxes on consumption therefore reduce our incentive to work, just 
as the tax on labor itself does. To Atkinson and Stiglitz, a labor income tax is no 
different than a uniform tax on all possible consumption choices.48 
In the real world, many sales tax regimes impose different prices on different 
goods, a choice which Atkinson and Stiglitz argue is inefficient.49 By taxing 
some products and not others, the government is distorting consumers’ choices 
between the taxed and untaxed goods.50 And, because the sales tax will also 
reduce labor supply to the same extent as an income tax that raised the same 
40. See Pauly, supra note 38, at 407–11. 
41. See Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 622, 
626 (1994) [hereinafter Gruber, Incidence]; Jonathan Gruber, The Efficiency of a Group-Specific 
Mandated Benefit: Evidence from Health Insurance Benefits for Maternity 12–14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 4157, 1992). 
42. See Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 74. 
43. See Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1003, 1008 (2001) (first using the term “double-distortion”). 
44. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 37, at 667–68; cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness 
Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) (noting income tax-and-transfer programs “tend to 
involve less distortion”). 
45. Alan J. Auerbach & James R. Hines Jr., Taxation and Economic Efficiency, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1347, 1349 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002). 
46. See Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 70. 
47. See Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Triangle (Warner Bros. television broadcast Jan. 9, 2001) (“I like 
money better than people. People can so rarely be exchanged for goods and/or services.”). 
48. Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 64; see also Ian Crawford et al., Value Added Tax and 
Excises, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN 275, 281 (James A. Mirrlees et al. eds., 2010). 
49. See Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 70. 
50. See id. 
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revenue, under some basic assumptions the “differentiated” consumption tax can 
never be as efficient as a tax on labor alone.51 
It is worth emphasizing that this double-distortion result depends on the 
assumptions that underlie it. In particular, Atkinson and Stiglitz assume that indi-
viduals do not differ in their consumption preferences, and that the consumption 
goods that are taxed do not have any direct effect on an individual’s choice about 
how much labor to supply.52 As we will explore in section III.A below, Atkinson 
and Stiglitz and many subsequent authors have acknowledged that their result— 
labor taxes are always more efficient than a differentiated consumption tax— 
would not necessarily hold if these assumptions failed. 
In any event, a cross-subsidy has the same economic effects as a differentiated 
consumption tax in the Atkinson–Stiglitz sense. Net payors in the pool pay 
more as a result of their consumption of the pooled good, discouraging their 
participation in the pool.53 We would add to this story that the differentiated 
impact of cross-subsidies (and of more formal consumption taxes) are particularly 
problematic in the special context where many cross-subsidies are employed. 
Government subsidies are often used to encourage the production of positive 
externalities.54 Cross-subsidies, then, often burden some positive externalities and 
subsidize others.55 Imagine, for example, that Congress wants to encourage home 
installation of solar cells. It awards grants of $100 per cell for 10,000 households, 
funded by a tax of $100 per cell on another 10,000 households. As we will see in 
section III.C, it is possible to imagine scenarios where this would not be absurd. 
But at least at first blush, it is not a promising plan. 
Finally, we should note that the Atkinson–Stiglitz result is itself open to criti-
cism and is not necessarily the final word on this subject. Here, we take it as a 
given because of the force and intuition of the arguments in its favor and because 
it has become a touchstone in the legal academy, especially among tax scholars. 
51. KAPLOW, supra note 14, at 5. 
52. This is sometimes known as the “separability” assumption. See Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 
12, at 68. 
53. See KRISTIN KOMIVES ET AL., WORLD BANK, WATER, ELECTRICITY, AND THE POOR: WHO 
BENEFITS FROM UTILITY SUBSIDIES? 17 (2005); Posner, supra note 2, at 23–24. Posner argued that “it is 
not obvious that raising income tax rates would be a more efficient method of providing . . . services . . . 
than [cross-]subsidization,” but he was writing well before Atkinson and Stiglitz. See Posner, supra note 
2, at 42. 
We do not mean to suggest that estimating the deadweight loss of cross-subsidies is always 
straightforward, especially in complex markets. See Finkelstein et al., supra note 3, at 47–53 (examining 
welfare effects of gender nondiscrimination rules for pension annuities when annuity sellers can offset 
distortions with contracts). 
54. Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price 
Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 832, 840 (2012). 
55. Cf. Ross C. Eriksson et al., Targeted and Untargeted Subsidy Schemes: Evidence from 
Postdivestiture Efforts to Promote Universal Telephone Service, 41 J.L. & ECON. 477, 500 (1998) 
(noting that if cross-subsidies for telecommunications services are justified by network externalities, 
price increases for some may offset benefits of price reductions for others); Daniel Shaviro, The 
Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 
408 (1997) (criticizing minimum wage because it aids low-wage work through a tax on low-wage 
workers). 
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But it is also highly stylized and relies on some simplistic assumptions, some of 
which we address in Part IV below. We use it here as much as an organizing de-
vice for analysis as we do for the result itself. That said, we still take as a starting 
point the general conclusion that, all else equal, differentiated consumption taxes 
should be avoided. 
2. Broaden the Tax Base 
We turn now to the second pillar of public finance economics, which is that the 
tax base should include as many taxpayers as possible. As with the Atkinson– 
Stiglitz argument, this is a theory about the distortiveness of the tax system. In 
general, the social cost of taxes increases exponentially with the tax rate.56 One 
hundred dollars raised from Jake alone is twice as distortive as if we collected 
fifty each from Jake and Brendan.57 If we distribute the burden of paying for gov-
ernment as widely as possible, each individual contributor can face a lower rate, 
allowing for a lower social cost for any given amount of revenue.58 This same 
point can also be put in terms of risk, as in Guido Calabresi’s account of the costs 
of accidents: because of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth and related 
factors, societies should strive to distribute risk, including the risk of having to 
support government, as widely and thinly as possible.59 
Cross-subsidies often violate this principle.60 Usually, the net payor members 
of a pool will number much fewer than all taxpayers.61 Those payors therefore 
face a higher tax rate increase than would be needed if the same total payments 
were contributed from general revenues.62 A lesser-known but related point is 
that by assigning costs to the Treasury rather than to a pool, policymakers can 
also spread the resulting tax burden out over time, through government borrow-
ing.63 Cross-subsidies make this kind of intertemporal burden sharing more com-
plex, if not impossible. 
56. Auerbach & Hines, supra note 45, at 1349–55. 
57. See id. 
58. Cremer et al., supra note 21, at 29 & n.38; see also Gruber, Incidence, supra note 41, at 626. 
This claim assumes that the administrative costs of the tax system are unaffected by the number of 
taxpayers. It is plausible that there are relatively fixed costs of tax compliance per taxpayer, which 
would imply that adding new taxpayers will slightly increase the costs of the tax system as a whole. 
Similarly, it may be that greater numbers of taxpayers make for more difficult enforcement and 
collections. These costs would have to be weighed against the gains from base-broadening. 
59. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 39–40, 45 
(1970). 
60. See KOMIVES ET AL., supra note 53, at 18–19; Gruber, Incidence, supra note 41, at 626; Lester, 
supra note 4, at 62. The story may be more complicated in markets with many interacting factors, such 
as in private annuity sales. See Finkelstein et al., supra note 3, at 52. 
61. Cf. Finkelstein et al., supra note 3, at 52. This might not be the case, if the pool includes 
individuals from outside the taxing jurisdiction. 
62. See Gruber, Incidence, supra note 41, at 626; see John Holahan et al., A New Approach to Risk- 
Spreading via Coverage-Expansion Subsidies, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 277, 280 (2003). 
63. See Chetty & Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 141 (describing government’s ability to transfer 
between generations). 
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Calabresi recognized that his argument about risk spreading implied that the 
costs of accidents should be borne by society as a whole, but suggested that the 
necessary risk spreading could often be accomplished without the need to impose 
taxes.64 Instead, Calabresi claimed, private arrangements with and between insur-
ers could accomplish the same task.65 Consider the tort liability of careless driv-
ers. The driver can distribute the risk of paying a tort award by buying auto 
insurance, which shares the costs of payment among other customers of the in-
surer. The insurer, in turn, can purchase reinsurance to help cover itself against 
the risk of claims in excess of paid-in premiums.66 Reinsurers can themselves 
reinsure further, often by dipping into a global investor market.67 
See FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE BREADTH AND SCOPE OF THE GLOBAL 
REINSURANCE MARKET AND THE CRITICAL ROLE SUCH MARKET PLAYS IN SUPPORTING INSURANCE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 12–14 (2014), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/ 
Documents/FIO%20-%20Reinsurance%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/379L-8EDD]. 
The ability to 
recapitalize also gives insurers the capacity, like governments, to share current 
payment burdens with future contributors.68 
The burden-spreading argument against cross-subsidies, then, turns on the effi-
cacy of private substitutes for taxation.69 If insurance and reinsurance markets 
work perfectly, the burdens of a cross-subsidy can potentially be shifted to be at 
least as broad as a general tax on the population.70 On the other hand, if there are 
failures at any step along the way, whether between the insured and the primary 
insurer or between insurer and reinsurer, general revenues might be preferable to 
pooling. 
In many cases, however, insurance markets are incomplete or nonexistent. 
Asymmetric information is the usual culprit: if the insured knows more about his 
or her own risks than the insurer can observe, the insurer may be unable to price 
its policy appropriately.71 Moral hazard, or the tendency of those with insurance 
to neglect to minimize their exposure to risk, is also a concern.72 These factors 
combine to eliminate private credit or insurance markets in many essential areas, 
such as unemployment risk, and to severely curtail them in others, such as student 
borrowing and long-term disability.73 
64. See CALABRESI, supra note 59, at 45, 47–48. 
65. See id. at 47–48. 
66. See Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 350–68 
(2009). 
67. 
68. See J. David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss, The Global Market for Reinsurance: Consolidation, 
Capacity, and Efficiency, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 159, 165 (2000). 
69. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 583–84 
(1986) (making this point about takings). 
70. Cf. Scott E. Harrington & Helen I. Doerpinghaus, The Economics and Politics of Automobile 
Insurance Rate Classification, 60 J. RISK & INS. 59, 74 (1993) (pointing out that reinsurance will 
mitigate costs of any ban on discrimination in auto insurance underwriting). 
71. See generally Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976) (discussing the 
difficulties asymmetric information creates in markets). 
72. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard, 8 
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 4, 6 (1983). 
73. See Chetty & Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 118–19. 
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One last point to raise is that taxes and cross-subsidy payments do not always 
burden the party who bears the legal obligation to pay them.74 This question of 
who bears the real economic burden of a tax, called the “incidence” of the tax,75 
goes directly to the burden-spreading critique of cross-subsidies. If the economic 
incidence of a cross-subsidy payment is shifted to others, the effective tax rate on 
the pool’s payors may be much less than it seems at first glance.76 For example, 
many cities “pay” for affordable housing by requiring developers of new housing 
to set aside some number of units as affordable.77 This mandate looks to be under-
written by a cross-subsidy, in which developers and purchasers of market-rate 
housing subsidize homes for low-income residents. Superficially, it seems as 
though this imposes a needlessly high tax rate on the market-rate buyers, relative 
to financing that drew on all of the city’s taxpayers. But what is the incidence of 
the affordable-housing mandate? Some economists believe that taxes on real 
estate are actually borne by all investors in capital78—a much wider pool than the 
city’s own taxpayers. In short, we have to know the incidence of any given cross- 
subsidy payment before we know whether a base-broadening critique of it makes 
sense. 
II. THE UBIQUITY OF CROSS-SUBSIDIES 
If critics of the ACA are right, then many aspects of the U.S. legal system are 
also problematic. As we have just seen, any policy in which resources are trans-
ferred “horizontally” between consumers of the same good or suppliers of the 
same service or product can be a cross-subsidy. If that transfer of resources could 
instead have been funded with taxpayer dollars, it is open to the same critique 
that commentators have offered for the ACA. In his influential early article,  
74. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 586, 607–12 (5th ed. 2016) (discussing 
taxes); John J. Donohue III, Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of Legislatively Mandated 
Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897, 911–12 (2001) (discussing cross-subsidies). 
Think of two parallel roads, one of which is newly subject to a toll. Traffic will predictably shift to the 
other road. We should expect drivers to choose the toll-free road up to the point at which the hassle and 
delay of the added traffic “costs” them (in intangible aggravation and real lost wages) exactly the toll 
amount—that is, in equilibrium, it will always be equally costly to drive on either road. Drivers on the 
toll road will get back some of their toll in the form of a faster ride. Drivers on the toll-free road, 
meanwhile, are paying some of the new toll. 
75. See GRUBER, supra note 74, at 586. 
76. See Alfred E. Kahn, The Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 
144 (1984) (observing cross-subsidy that was burdening business was actually passed on to business 
customers). 
77. See Michael Floryan, Cracking the Foundation: Highlighting and Criticizing the Shortcomings 
of Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning Practices, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1039, 1051 (2010). 
78. See, e.g., Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence, in 4 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS 1787, 1815–16 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002). The theory is that, by 
making housing less desirable as an investment, money is channeled to other places; given the law of 
supply and demand, these alternative investments will no longer need to pay as much. See id. at 1816. 
Consumers may bear a portion of the affordable-housing mandate, however, to the extent that it is 
imposed non-uniformly. Id. 
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Richard Posner identified a wide variety of potential cross-subsidies.79 In this 
Part, we wish to highlight some of these cross-subsidies and point out a number 
of others. 
First, there are a number of policies that are recognized as cross-subsidies, at 
least among sophisticated commentators. Public utilities are a classic example.80 
Because they depend on a physical infrastructure for transmission, telephone, 
electricity, gas, and water are all more costly to provide to rural customers.81 
Nonetheless, in most countries, customers pay a uniform rate for such public util-
ities, with urban customers paying a portion of the cost of delivering service to ru-
ral households.82 The same is broadly true, by statute and FCC regulation, of 
other modern telecommunications services in the United States.83 Likewise, the 
U.S. Postal Service charges the same delivery fee for every household even 
though delivering to suburban and rural areas is more expensive than delivering 
to urban areas.84 
Commentators have also noted that many workplace regulations, including 
antidiscrimination laws and wage and hour regulations, similarly use cross- 
subsidies to redistribute income among workers.85 For example, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires employers to make reasonable accommo-
dations for individuals who meet the essential qualifications of a position;86 
these expenses likely reduce average wages.87 Minimum wage laws transfer 
income to low-wage workers from those who just missed out on landing an 
entry-level job.88 
79. See Posner, supra note 2, at 23–24 (providing examples including automobile liability insurance, 
uniform telephone rates, distance-based airline and rail passenger rates, and flat rates in urban transit 
systems). 
80. See KOMIVES ET AL., supra note 53, at 1; see also Faulhaber, supra note 1, at 966 (discussing 
railroad services). 
81. KOMIVES ET AL., supra note 53, at 10; Hausman, supra note 10, at 34 n.17. 
82. KOMIVES ET AL., supra note 53, at 19–27 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of water and 
electricity utilities). The World Bank’s monograph discusses other cross-subsidy vectors in utilities, 
such as deliberate failure to shut off households that illegally connect to the network. See id. at 11. 
83. Cremer et al., supra note 21, at 6 & n.1; Eriksson et al., supra note 55, at 480. 
84. Cremer et al., supra note 21, at 16–17. 
85. See, e.g., Jolls, Labor Market, supra note 4, at 375–76. See generally Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 
10, at 336–43 (discussing redistribution effects of fixed-cost mandated benefits). Nondiscriminatory 
employer-provided pensions offer another example. Finkelstein et al., supra note 3, at 39. 
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012). 
87. See Jolls, Labor Market, supra note 4, at 376. As Professor Jolls emphasizes, however, to the 
extent that antidiscrimination laws are not fully enforceable, other workplace rules benefitting protected 
groups, such as the ADA or the Family and Medical Leave Act, may not result in cross-subsidies. See 
Jolls, Accommodation, supra note 4, at 248. Rather, if employers are somewhat free to do so, they will 
impose the costs of those mandates on the protected group itself, resulting in no or only partial net 
welfare gains. See id. Jolls argues that empirical evidence implies that policies aimed at redistributing to 
women tend to fail for this reason. Id. at 284–87. Whether the ADA had net benefits for individuals with 
disabilities is more contentious, but we agree with the assessment that it likely did. See Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People with Disabilities?, 
25 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 527, 530 (2004). 
88. Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 10, at 343; Shaviro, supra note 55, at 416–17. 
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Kyle Logue and Ronen Avraham have shown that products-liability torts addi-
tionally create cross-subsidies.89 The tort system is effectively a form of manda-
tory insurance for an injury, such as pain and suffering, that consumers would 
otherwise find difficult to insure.90 When consumers buy a product, they are also 
purchasing the unwaivable right to sue the manufacturer in the event the con-
sumer is injured by actionable design or other defects.91 This contract, however, 
is not priced differently for insureds who present different risks for the insurer.92 
Therefore, low-risk purchasers of the product are paying a premium to cover the 
expected costs of high-risk purchasers.93 
We would add to Logue and Avraham’s account by observing that the tax sys-
tem shifts some of these costs to the general public. Tort awards other than puni-
tive damages are not usually taxed, which often allows the tortfeasor to make a 
less than fully compensatory payment.94 In effect, a portion of the tort award is 
paid from the Treasury: the injured person takes home the same after-tax award, 
but the tortfeasor pays less.95 Further, in the case of business-to-business sales, 
the cost of the cross-subsidy can be deducted from the payor’s tax, providing 
a twenty-one percent96 
See Kelsey Snell, Final Version of GOP Tax Bill Cuts Corporate Tax Rate to 21 Percent, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Dec. 15, 2017, 7:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/15/571257526/final-version-of- 
gop-tax-bill-cuts-corporate-tax-rate-to-21-percent [https://perma.cc/E5MU-ZYDG]. 
federal contribution to the cost for contemporary 
corporations.97 
In prior work, we have pointed out yet other cross-subsidies. As Maher 
observes, defined-benefit pensions, such as those still widespread in public sector 
89. See Logue & Avraham, supra note 4, at 229. 
90. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 1437, 1462–63, 1466–67 (2010). 
91. The widespread use of mandatory arbitration provisions has recently moved us towards a world 
of at least partial waiver, at least for claims that are impracticable without a class action. 
92. Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Products Liability, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2457, 
2483–84 (2013); cf. Richard Craswell, Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution 
in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 373 (1991) (explaining why sellers usually cannot 
distinguish among consumers). 
93. See Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Should Consumers Be Permitted to Waive Products 
Liability? Product Safety, Private Contracts, and Adverse Selection, 30 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 734, 735 
(2014) (discussing whether firms and consumers should be free to design their own liability schemes for 
defective products). For more information on the possible sources of risk variation among consumers, 
see id. at 736–37. 
94. Cf. Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, How the Income Tax Undermines Civil Rights Law, 73 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1101–02 (2000) (discussing division of tax-favorable treatment between plaintiff 
and defendant). For critical discussion of the traditional rationales for the exclusion of tort damage 
awards, see Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 182–87 (1992). 
95. States can upend this rule if they instruct juries to take taxability into account when awarding 
damages. See Gregg D. Polsky & Dan Markel, Taxing Punitive Damages, 96 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1305– 
06 (2010) (discussing jury awareness of tax consequences of awards they render). 
96. 
97. See Dodge, supra note 94, at 174. Dodge and Polinsky and Shavell each argue that a deduction is 
not a subsidy because tort damages substitute for precautions, and precautions are deductible. See id. at 
176; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 869, 929–30 (1998). This is wrong. Most precautions are capital investments and must be 
capitalized (deducted slowly over time) rather than deducted. See I.R.C. §§ 263, 263A. Thus, a 
deduction is a subsidy at least to the extent that it accelerates the claiming of precaution costs. 
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jobs, promise an annuity, or fixed annual payment, for the life of the retiree.98 
Defined-benefit pensions are far more valuable to long-lived employees, yet an 
employer likely cannot individually adjust the salary paid to those it expects to 
live longest to reflect this higher expected payout.99 In addition, Brooks shows 
that the contemporary financing structure of student loans—including income- 
driven repayment programs, such as Income-Based Repayment (IBR) and Pay As 
You Earn (PAYE)—underwrites poets (and other students at greater risk of drop- 
out or default) at the expense of engineers (and other safer bets).100 
We now will detail several other important areas in which cross-subsidies play 
an important, but so far neglected, role. 
A. FAMILY LEAVE BENEFITS 
When it comes to family leave policies, the United States is among the least 
generous developed countries in the world.101 For the most part, U.S. employers 
have no legal obligation to pay workers on leave to care for family members 
unless specifically bargained for, though California, New Jersey, Rhode Island, 
New York, the District of Columbia, and Washington provide notable excep-
tions.102 
See State Family and Medical Leave Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 
19, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-family-and-medical-leave-laws. 
aspx [https://perma.cc/77Q6-NPJM]; Adam Lidgett, Washington Gov. Signs Paid Family Leave Plan 
into Law, LAW360 (July 6, 2017, 3:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/941663/washington-gov- 
signs-paid-family-leave-plan-into-law [https://perma.cc/Z4BV-7ZRS]; Bill Miossi & Scott Phillips, 
Deciphering DC’s New Universal Paid Leave Law, LAW360 (Apr. 24, 2017, 6:30 PM), https://www. 
law360.com/articles/915070/deciphering-dc-snew-universal-paid-leave-law [https://perma.cc/AVW4- 
VMM4]. 
Both of the two leading Democratic Party candidates for President in 
2016 proposed large expansions of paid family leave as part of their platforms.103 
See Alice Miranda Ollstein, Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton Face Off on Who Should Pay 
for Paid Family Leave, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 8, 2016, 3:14 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/bernie- 
sanders-and-hillary-clinton-face-off-on-who-should-pay-for-paid-family-leave-97781198cd61 [https:// 
perma.cc/U3WV-947Q]. 
The U.S. requires employers to offer unpaid family leave for up to twelve weeks, 
but that duration is modest by global standards.104 
As Gillian Lester has pointed out, family leave benefits, in combination with 
other rules prohibiting wage and hiring discrimination on the basis of gender, 
tend to create cross-subsidies in favor of households that include working 
women.105 The cost of these transfers is not limited just to paying wages for work-
ers who are not working, but also includes the burden of arranging the workforce 
to account for the possibility of family leave, such as by training employees to 
have overlapping skills, designing production processes to accommodate missing 
98. Maher, supra note 25, at 1269–70. 
99. Id. at 1281–82. 
100. John R. Brooks, Student Loans as Taxes, 151 TAX NOTES 513, 516 (2016); John R. Brooks, 
Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher Education, 104 GEO. L.J. 229, 271–72 
(2016) [hereinafter Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment]. 
101. Lester, supra note 4, at 3. 
102. 
103. 
104. Lester, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
105. See Lester, supra note 4, at 58. 
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essential employees, or simply hiring temporary fill-in workers. In the absence of 
antidiscrimination laws, some employers might shift the costs of mandatory leave 
to working women, who claim the bulk of family leave benefits.106 An employer 
focused only on its bottom line might try to pay women less or even refuse to hire 
women in an effort to try to control those costs.107 Because both these policies are 
at least officially illegal, employers under economic pressure may seek to pay all 
workers less instead.108 Thus, the costs of family leave policy are borne, in part 
by all workers rather than just by those most likely to utilize it.109 
B. PATENT LAW 
Patent law and related intellectual property protections, such as copyright, 
offer interesting examples of cross-subsidies that support the future at the cost of 
the present. Because many inventions could easily be copied, inventors may not 
be inclined to innovate at socially optimal levels.110 Intellectual property aims to 
reverse this market failure by granting inventors a temporary monopoly—for 
most U.S. patents, twenty years from the date of filing,111 and for most copyrights, 
the life of the creator plus seventy years.112 All individuals who purchase or make 
use of the invention benefit from its creation, but only those who pay for it during 
the monopoly period are contributing to the financing of the government’s 
106. See Jolls, Labor Market, supra note 4, at 374–75, 379 (summarizing studies suggesting that 
family-leave mandates may reduce women’s wages). 
107. Employers likely do not value paid leave at its cost to them because many of its benefits are 
externalities—they benefit individuals outside the firm, such as those who value gender equality. In this 
case, the employer will only offer benefits if workers will accept a corresponding salary reduction, but 
bargaining and other market failures often preclude that outcome. See Lester, supra note 4, at 10–11, 
14–15. Society as a whole would benefit from expanding female workforce participation and from pro- 
natal policies (and from gender equality more generally), but in many cases these policies would benefit 
a given company only marginally. See id. at 18–33. Government action may be needed to overcome this 
collective-action problem. See Jolls, Labor Market, supra note 4, at 364 (discussing externality 
rationales for workplace regulation). 
108. Franc¸ois Melese, Government-Mandated Benefits, Taxes, and Wages, 62 S. ECON. J. 53, 63 
(1995). Employers could also attempt to reduce workforce, raise prices, accept lower profits, or some 
combination of all these. The economic burden of a tax or regulatory burden will tend to fall on the least 
elastic party. For instance, if consumer demand for the product regulated employers make is highly 
inelastic (for example, oxygen on Mars), most of the cost of regulation can be passed to consumers. Our 
analysis of “cross-subsidies” assumes that at least some portion of the cost of regulation is paid for by 
actors in a comparable position to the beneficiary—that workers bear the costs of worker protections, for 
instance. 
109. See Jolls, Labor Market, supra note 4, at 376 (describing “targeted” workplace benefits). Some 
have questioned whether we should truly consider this a cross-subsidy from men (and women without 
children) toward women with children, because the proper baseline should not be a world in which 
childbearing women bear all of the costs of child care. But we could instead describe mandatory family 
leave as correcting a cross-penalty rather than introducing a cross-subsidy without altering our 
fundamental point. Our point is not about whether to share costs of child-rearing collectively; our point 
is, having decided to do so, cross-subsidization is one policy instrument that should be analyzed and 
compared to others. 
110. Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual 
Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5 (1991). 
111. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
112. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
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incentive. In other words, those who pay while the invention is on patent under-
write those who buy a later generic. 
Patent scholars recognize that granting patent holders a monopoly right in their 
invention is only one of several possible ways that governments could encourage 
innovation.113 Like taxes, monopolies create deadweight loss.114 Because the 
seller limits quantity to keep prices artificially high, there will be some consumers 
who will not buy the product but who might have otherwise been willing to do so 
at a competitive price.115 Competitors who might have earned profits in an open 
market also lose out.116 Whether this cost is greater or less than the social cost of 
simply awarding grants—paid for with general tax revenues—is a subject of 
intense recent debate.117 
C. CLASS ACTIONS 
The central conceit of the class action is to provide a procedural device that 
permits numerous, similar, small-value claims to be aggregated and litigated to-
gether. Given relatively fixed litigation and other costs, many small-value suits 
would not generate a positive expected value for individual litigants.118 Grouping 
claims together economizes these costs and permits a remedy and a potential 
deterrent effect where none might otherwise arise.119 To be sure, there are other 
contending considerations to the class-action model;120 but we need not explore 
the intricacies of those considerations, other than to point out that whatever 
the intent or merits of the class-action device, it cannot and does not afford the 
type of individualized relief one commonly expects the American system to 
provide.121 
113. See generally Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best 
Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002) 
(comparing intellectual property and alternative incentive mechanisms, namely prizes and procurement 
contracts); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research 
Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983) (same). 
114. Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 113, at 54. 
115. See id. 
116. The patent’s cost may also fall on consumers who shift to substitute, unpatented products. As 
demand rises for the substitute product, so do prices. 
117. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 303, 305 (2013); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 
U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1001–08 (2014). 
118. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The . . . alternative 
to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic 
sues for $30.”). 
119. See, e.g., id.; Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class 
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684–86 (1941). 
120. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American 
Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 413–17 (2014) (discussing class actions as unnecessary litigation 
created to benefit attorneys rather than plaintiffs). See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE 
JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009) 
(discussing benefits and drawbacks of class-action model). 
121. See David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective 
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 562, 565–66 (1987) (noting that class actions “average” claims in a way that is 
hostile to the “individual justice tradition”). 
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As a result, the necessary practical consequence of the class-action model is 
that stronger claims are packaged with weaker claims in constructing the true unit 
of relief: the class.122 It is precisely that bundling which motivates the class-action 
attorney to embark upon the litigation: the attorney has only to establish that class 
claims are sufficiently similar to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.123 
Similarly, in certifying and resolving the case, there is little real effort to distin-
guish claims beyond some modest categorization, which cannot possibly corre-
spond to the actual merit and value one would assign to each individualized 
claim.124 By authorizing the class attorney and the court to present and certify a 
class, the Federal Rules and other governing statutes greenlight a cross-subsidy 
as part of a larger strategy to advance socially valuable aims.125 
A class-action system is not the only possible way to achieve these aims, how-
ever. Why use the class action rather than, say, public financing of attorneys who 
could bring small-value claims individually, which would avoid the downsides of 
cross-subsidization? That question has never been explored satisfactorily in all 
the extensive literature on class actions. 
III. WHEN ARE CROSS-SUBSIDIES EFFICIENT? 
The prior Parts set up the main question this Article attempts to answer: If 
cross-subsidization is an inferior way of paying for public and social programs, 
why is it so ubiquitous? The answer in this Part is that cross-subsidization may 
not be so bad and, in some cases, may actually be the preferred policy design 
choice. We describe four reasons that cross-subsidization may be a more efficient 
form of public financing than tax and transfer: it can better address exceptions to 
and weaknesses in the Atkinson–Stiglitz framework, it can better approximate 
nondistortionary benefit taxation, it can avoid oversubsidizing inframarginal con-
sumers, and it can take advantage of both the pure and political economic benefits 
of being less salient to individuals. We address each of these reasons in turn 
below. 
A. KNOWN EXCEPTIONS TO THE ATKINSON–STIGLITZ FRAMEWORK AND THEIR 
APPLICATION TO CROSS-SUBSIDIES 
Although the conventional wisdom, as we have said, is that governments 
should avoid differentiated consumption taxes, the existing literature recognizes 
122. That fact that plaintiffs may opt out in some cases, or the use of sub-classes or damage formulas, 
does not undo the reality that the class is the true unit of relief. 
123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
124. Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to Regulating Class 
Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1072–73 (2005). 
125. In addition, some may explain the fact that fewer “strong” plaintiffs than one would expect opt 
out as a consequence of ignorance or apathy, but these plaintiffs may actually be willing to forego 
pursuing a stronger claim in exchange for increasing the strength of the class-action suit as a means to 
“stick it” to wrongdoers. Cf. Brendan S. Maher, The Civil Judicial Subsidy, 85 IND. L.J. 1527, 1535 
(2010) (discussing “Ultimatum Game” studies in which participants chose to be worse off to prevent 
unfairness). Players willing to pay a fairness premium are, in our parlance, inframarginal actors who 
might be desirably employed as regulatory adjuncts. 
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three key exceptions to that principle. Two of these are long-standing and indeed 
are mentioned by Atkinson and Stiglitz in their original article.126 We call these 
the “informational advantage” and “leisure complement” theories, respectively. 
The third theory, dealing with the possibility that tax avoidance is more important 
than labor/leisure distortions, is relatively recent, and has been developed most 
comprehensively by David Gamage.127 All three theories describe ways in which 
consumption taxes—and thus, potentially, cross-subsidies—can sometimes solve 
or improve on problems created by the income tax. Because the first two excep-
tions are well-known, our discussion of them will be brief and limited to high-
lighting the aspects that are most important for cross-subsidies.128 
1. Informational Advantages of Cross-Subsidies 
Many commentators recognize that a differentiated consumption tax can some-
times help to overcome the informational shortcomings of an income tax.129 The 
basic problem is that governments usually cannot observe our underlying ability 
to earn money.130 An individual might have what it takes to be an investment 
banker, but envy the lifestyle of a beachcomber. Because bankers earn more 
money, they also face higher tax rates, encouraging our would-be investment 
banker to hit the beach.131 
Ideally, taxing authorities would prefer that the tax system not influence our 
choice of careers, especially if tax pushes us in less productive directions.132 One 
way to achieve that goal would be to tax not income itself, but the underlying 
ability to earn income.133 If the government could observe an individual’s bank-
ing chops, it could impose a banker’s higher tax rate on that individual regardless 
of whether she actually wears pinstripes, thereby eliminating the tax incentive to  
126. See Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 12. 
127. See generally David Gamage, How Should Governments Promote Distributive Justice?: A 
Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1 (2014) [hereinafter 
Gamage, Framework]; David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption, 
Capital Income, and Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355 (2015) [hereinafter Gamage, The Case]. 
128. For a cogent summary on how taxing authorities should apply the first two exceptions to the 
design of tax systems, see Chris William Sanchirico, Tax Eclecticism, 64 TAX L. REV. 149, 194–218 
(2011). 
129. See, e.g., Robin Boadway & Maurice Marchand, The Use of Public Expenditures for 
Redistributive Purposes, 47 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 45, 51 (1995); Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari, 
In-Kind Transfers, Self-Selection and Optimal Tax Policy, 41 EUR. ECON. REV. 97, 101–02, 112–13 
(1997); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences, 8 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & 
POL’Y 1, 15–16 (2008); J.A. Mirrlees, Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 327, 328–56 
(1976); Emmanuel Saez, The Desirability of Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear Income Taxation 
and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J. PUB. ECON. 217, 226 (2002). 
130. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation, 17 J. PUB. ECON. 213, 214 
(1982). 
131. See id. at 221 (describing the government’s problem as choosing policies so that “the more able 
do not wish to pretend to be less able”). 
132. See id. 
133. See Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives Should Affect Taxes but 
Not Program Choice or Design, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 264, 279–80 (1979). 
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beachcomb.134 That is usually impossible (and, perhaps morally objectionable), 
but there may be some forms of consumption that are favored by individuals with 
high, but not low, ability.135 Taxing these forms of consumption would be, then, a 
tax based on ability.136 
For example, suppose that sugar-sweetened beverages are favored by impatient 
or inattentive individuals who tend to have lower lifetime earnings.137 Taxes on 
bottled water might in effect tax earning ability, though they might be undesirable 
from a public health perspective.138 
In some cases, cross-subsidies may similarly serve as a tax on the ability to 
earn.139 Most straightforwardly, consider workplace rules guaranteeing paid fam-
ily leave, sick time, and freedom from discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.140 In an unregulated workplace, the beneficiaries of these rules likely 
have lower earning power, owing to employer discrimination or higher perceived 
costs of employing these groups, than do other members of the pool. If the inci-
dence of the mandate instead falls on all workers, not just the main beneficiaries, 
it can serve as a tax on the higher “ability” workers.141 Subsidized water and other 
utilities for impoverished areas similarly channel resources to individuals who 
otherwise would have low lifetime productivity.142 
134. Ability taxes are most efficient when the underlying characteristic that is taxed is not readily 
changeable, so that there is little new distortion from the ability tax. But this need not be the case as long 
as the distortion created by the ability tax is less costly overall than the distortions caused by the income 
taxes it replaces. 
135. Stiglitz, supra note 130, at 237–38; Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Targeting 
Transfers Through Restrictions on Recipients, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 372, 372–73 (1982). 
136. Saez, supra note 129, at 226; Stiglitz, supra note 130, at 238. Kaplow extends this framework to 
cases in which the government wishes to tax individuals differently on bases other than ability to earn, 
such as variations in their preferences. See Kaplow, supra note 129, at 15–19. 
In a similar spirit are proposals that the government provide in-kind benefits to low-ability earners, 
where those benefits would not be valued by individuals with high ability. See Boadway & Marchand, 
supra note 129, at 51, 54; Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets 
the Data, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 333, 353–56 (2008) (providing an exhaustive survey); Nichols & Zeckhauser, 
supra note 135, at 376. 
137. Cf. James J. Heckman et al., The Rate of Return to the HighScope Perry Preschool Program, 94 
J. PUB. ECON. 114 (2010) (estimating adult benefits of childhood development of patience and 
persistence); Walter Mischel et al., Delay of Gratification in Children, 244 SCIENCE 933 (1989) 
(examining impact of impatience on learning). 
138. An example in the cross-subsidy context is a law prohibiting insurer or employer discrimination 
based on genetic information. See Kyle Logue & Joel Slemrod, Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of 
Widely Available Genetic Information, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 843, 858 (2008). Logue and Slemrod defend 
these rules as potentially efficient taxes on those with higher-value genes. See id. at 861. 
139. HELMUTH CREMER ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE: THEORY 4–5 (World Bank 
1998); Boadway & Marchand, supra note 129, at 57–58; Cremer et al., supra note 21, at 15. 
140. See Avraham et al., supra note 4, at 211; Hila Shamir, Between Home and Work: Assessing the 
Distributive Effects of Employment Law in Markets of Care, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 404, 407– 
15 (2009). 
141. Jolls, Accommodation, supra note 4, at 251. To be clear, “ability” in this context is not intended 
to convey any judgment about the worth of the individual but is rather merely a description of the 
worker’s likely maximum salary. 
142. Cf. KOMIVES ET AL., supra note 53, at 5, 153 (arguing that subsidized utilities redistribute to the 
poor on average). Public utilities in developing countries may also be inferior goods, which is to say that 
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2. Taxing Leisure Complements 
Another well-known limit on the Atkinson–Stiglitz result is that it may some-
times be appropriate for the government to impose a higher burden on so-called 
“leisure complements.”143 Income taxes make it more appealing to skip work and 
go to the park instead; to counter this distortion, the government could charge an 
entry fee at the park. 
Implementing this tactic through cross-subsidies is tricky because, by defini-
tion, everyone in the pool is buying the same good. For instance, if access to 
high-speed Internet is, on net, a leisure complement, then by taxing it, the govern-
ment could encourage work by making leisure somewhat more expensive.144 
Rules that require uniform Internet access pricing for rural or otherwise high-cost 
users would subsidize those users at the expense of others. In effect, the govern-
ment is taxing the low-cost urban users, encouraging them to work, but it is also 
encouraging rural households to stay home and binge-watch Netflix. The labor 
losses from the subsidized users, in other words, may reduce or even outweigh 
any labor gains from the transferors.145 
We see a few possible instances where pooling could still serve as an effective 
tax on leisure complements. For one, net gains are possible when the labor 
response of transferees is less elastic than the labor response of transferors—that 
is, if transferees do not change, or hardly change, their labor supply as a result of 
the new subsidy. If transferees reduce labor by fifty while transferors increase it 
by one hundred, we have a net gain in labor supply. 
Differences like this are possible if we have some existing distortion that 
weighs more heavily on one group than another. A common example might be 
when transferees face lower effective income tax rates than the transferors. 
Recall that we expect the behavioral impact of a tax to rise exponentially with the 
effective rate.146 A cross-subsidy that changes the effective tax rate from thirty- 
nine percent to forty percent will affect overall behavior by much more than a 
cross-subsidy that changes the effective tax rate from ten percent to nine percent. 
This makes it possible that an Internet cross-subsidy could increase the labor 
households with higher earnings prefer private consumption. Cf. id. at 46–47, 116 (noting that wealthier 
households in developing countries opt out of public utility systems). This further improves the 
“tagging” accuracy of the public system. Cf. id. (arguing that inferior goods are better targeted at poor 
populations). But see id. at 70 (reporting that many utility programs aimed at the poor do not effectively 
target money to the poor). 
143. Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 68; see Robin Boadway et al., Subsidies Versus Public 
Provision of Private Goods as Instruments for Redistribution, 100 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 545, 546, 
555 (1998); Vidar Christiansen, Which Commodity Taxes Should Supplement the Income Tax?, 24 J. 
PUB. ECON. 195 (1984); Saez, supra note 129, at 223–26. 
144. We do not intend to rule out the possibility that access to a good streaming service could also 
encourage work productivity. Galle recommends a “Walking on Sunshine” Pandora station, but the 
other two of us think that he is a dork. 
145. This same problem also interferes with a similar strategy, noted in Boadway & Marchand, supra 
note 129, at 57–58, of subsidizing a good that competes with leisure. 
146. See Auerbach & Hines, supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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supply of high-tax households by more than it reduces the labor of low-tax house-
holds, even if those groups are equally numerous.147 
By similar logic, taxing leisure complements might work when transferees 
greatly outnumber transferors. If there are only a few transferors and many trans-
ferees, the tax bill for each transferor is relatively big and the subsidy for each 
transferee relatively small. Because labor effects grow exponentially with the 
size of the tax or subsidy, the added labor effects for the few transferors will be 
larger, in the aggregate, than the lost labor of the transferees.148 
3. Minimizing Total Avoidance Costs 
The third scenario in which cross-subsidies can improve over the traditional 
income tax is when cross-subsidies and income taxes distort different behaviors. 
In that case, shifting some of the burden from an income tax onto a cross-subsidy 
(or other form of consumption tax) will be more efficient than relying on an 
income tax alone. We have seen that the Atkinson–Stiglitz “double-distortion” 
argument assumes that a consumption tax has just as much effect on labor deci-
sions as does an income tax.149 In that case, it will make no difference if we use 
an income tax, a consumption tax, or a combination of the two—labor market 
decisions will be distorted the same no matter what. A twenty percent income 
tax, a twenty percent consumption tax, or a combination of two ten percent taxes 
will all impose the same burden on labor market decisions—each dollar earned 
will take a twenty percent cut before being consumed. 
But, as David Gamage has argued, an income tax and a consumption tax 
may actually affect different behaviors.150 There is limited evidence that 
income taxes reduce labor supply for most workers.151 If an individual wants to 
reduce her income taxes, she is more likely to resort to other behaviors, such as 
under-reporting income, over-reporting deductions, or engaging in outright 
evasion. Similarly, an individual wanting to reduce consumption taxes is more 
likely to, for example, go to a cash-only dollar store, or ship purchased fine art  
147. See Shaviro, supra note 55, at 422. Because most income tax systems are progressive, it may 
sound like we are saying cross-subsidies should run from people with high incomes to those with low, 
but our message is a bit more nuanced than that. Our claim is that the cross-subsidy may be more 
efficient than an income tax when being a beneficiary is correlated with lower income, but not if a 
person can become a transferee by lowering their income. If income determines whether a person is a 
payor or transferor, then the pool is just an income tax in disguise. Our Internet example likely qualifies 
as a pool that taxes leisure efficiently and escapes this income-tax-in-disguise problem, because it 
defines the transferor and transferee groups by geography, not income. Rural households are often lower 
income (and, because they have fewer government amenities, less taxed overall), but one cannot get 
subsidized Internet just by reducing one’s labor effort. See Gary Paul Green, Sustainability and Rural 
Communities, 23 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 423 (2014); Lisa R. Pruitt, Missing the Mark: Welfare 
Reform and Rural Poverty, 10 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 439, 445–47 (2007). 
148. This assumes that the labor-elasticity of leisure and the amount transferred is equal on both 
sides. 
149. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
150. Gamage, Framework, supra note 127, at 24–29. 
151. Gamage, The Case, supra note 127, at 356 n.3, 388–94. 
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to his New Hampshire office instead of his New York home.152 In that case, 
instead of having the labor distortions of a twenty percent tax, we have the dis-
tinct evasion behaviors of two ten percent taxes. Because the deadweight loss of 
taxation increases with the square of the tax rate, we would prefer the latter; here, 
the whole truly is greater than the sum of the two parts.153 Where there are differ-
ent margins of distortion, as here, the government should keep shifting tax reve-
nue over to the new tax until, at the margin, the next dollar raised through either 
tax would be equally socially costly.154 
This argument comes with several important caveats, as Gamage recognizes. 
First, it must actually be the case that the two tax instruments affect different mar-
gins of behavior.155 That is usually an empirical question.156 Next, there may be 
extra public administrative and private compliance costs to creating a new tax, 
which might reduce or eliminate the benefits of adding the new tax.157 And 
finally, if the new tax is imposed on fewer people than the old tax, the burden it 
imposes may quickly catch up to the old tax—that is, Gamage’s overlap point 
does not eliminate the importance of base-broadening.158 
With these cautions in mind, we turn now to cross-subsidies. Cross-subsidies 
may create efficiencies, up to a point, by allowing the government to reduce 
income-tax rates. As cross-subsidies grow in magnitude, the distortions they cre-
ate will approach and eventually equal the costliness of the distortions created by 
the income tax.159 At that point, it will no longer make economic sense to shift 
from general revenues to cross-subsidies. When the pool of subsidy payers is 
much smaller than the pool of income-tax payers, the equalization point will 
occur at a much smaller cross-subsidy than it would if the pools were of similar 
size. 
The central assumption of this efficiency claim, however, is that subsidy 
payers’ responses to cross-subsidies do not overlap too much with their responses 
152. See, e.g., Mark Maremont & Jerry Markon, Ex-Tyco Chief Evaded $1 Million in Taxes on Art, 
Indictment Says, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2002, at A1. 
153. A simple formula for the deadweight loss of taxation in this case is often given as 12 hwlt
2
, where 
w is the wage rate, l is hours worked, h is the elasticity of substitution between labor and leisure, and t is 
the tax rate on labor. See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 336 (10th ed. 2015); 
see also Auerbach & Hines, supra note 45, at 1349–50 (defining deadweight loss as a “[t]ax-induced 
reduction[] in economic efficiency”). Thus, all else being equal, an increase in tax rates from, for 
example, five percent to ten percent would increase deadweight loss by seventy-five, but an increase 
from ten percent to fifteen percent would increase it by 125. Note, however, that this formula is 
simplified and that individual responses to taxation, both in theory and in evidence, are more 
complicated. Nonetheless, “it remains true that . . . the magnitude of excess burden is roughly 
proportional to the square of any . . . departure [from marginal cost pricing]”—for example, a tax. Id. at 
1415. 
154. Gamage, Framework, supra note 127, at 41–44; see also Crawford et al., supra note 48, at 282 
(noting that consumption tax may be fallback for evasion of income tax). 
155. Gamage, Framework, supra note 127, at 35–39. 
156. Gamage, The Case, supra note 127, at 387–400. 
157. Gamage, Framework, supra note 127, at 32–34; see also Margalioth, supra note 4, at 680–81. 
158. See Gamage, Framework, supra note 127, at 20. 
159. Cf. Posner, supra note 2, at 43 (noting that businesses may attempt to evade cross-subsidies). 
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to the income tax. If the ACA strongly motivates young men to avoid earning or 
reporting high income, there will not be much net gain from relying on cross-sub-
sidies rather than general revenues. In most cases, however, we believe that indi-
viduals will respond differently to different instruments.160 There are no obvious 
avoidance tactics for simultaneously escaping the burdens of both the tort system 
and the income tax, for example.161 
The “overlap” requirement does imply one significant limitation on the effi-
ciency of cross-subsidies: cross-subsidies likely cannot be used as a tool for redis-
tributing on the basis of income qua income. If the government is going to 
provide health insurance to the poor, it must identify who is poor, which is typi-
cally accomplished by measuring household incomes.162 
How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ 
topics/income-poverty/poverty/guidance/poverty-measures.html [https://perma.cc/7WJF-A763]. 
Even if this measure-
ment is not done directly through the income tax itself,163 
For instance, before the ACA, the definition of “income” for Medicaid eligibility purposes did 
not follow federal tax definitions, and was administered by states, not the IRS. See Annual Statistical 
Supplement, 2008, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2008/ 
medicaid.html [https://perma.cc/3B9E-B5WL]. 
in most cases, 
techniques for reducing income taxes will also reduce measured income for pur-
poses of these transfer programs. On the other hand, returning to Gamage’s argu-
ment, it may be possible to redistribute to the poor by using some quality that 
correlates with poverty, and which cannot be manipulated in the same ways 
income can. In some countries, for instance, transfers from urban to rural areas 
also on average transfer from rich to poor, and urban dwellers cannot conceal 
their urbanity by, for example, getting paid in cash. 
The “informal economy” may also be a constraint on our overlap argument. 
Many cross-subsidy systems depend on workplace regulation. It is possible that 
individuals can escape both from the income tax and from a costly cross-subsidy 
by working under the table.164 
 For a global overview of the informal economy, see Friedrich Schneider with Dominik Enste, 
Hiding in the Shadows: The Growth of the Underground Economy, 30 INT’L MONETARY FUND ECON. 
ISSUES (2002), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues30 [https://perma.cc/RB4B-SFJT]. 
An employer who pays her employees in cash to 
evade payroll taxes is probably not offering health benefits or complying with 
ERISA pension rules, either. In other words, cross-subsidies that rely on a regu-
lated employment relationship may increase incentives to defect to the informal 
economy.165 
160. See Margalioth, supra note 4, at 681 (arguing that typical tax avoidance behavior cannot reduce 
cross-subsidies). 
161. This claim does depend somewhat on how the tax “base” and the regulation are defined. For 
example, if both are effectively per-unit charges, they may encourage overlapping shifts from quantity 
to quality. Cf. Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 647, 661–64 (2000) (describing incentives to change quality of products in response to unit 
charges). 
162. 
163. 
164.
165. See Shaviro, supra note 55, at 417 (making this point about the minimum wage); cf. Krueger, 
supra note 10, at 29–30 (discussing compliance problems with workplace mandates). 
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B. BENEFIT TAXATION 
Paying for public goods using cross-subsidies may also be efficient where the 
cross-subsidy is better at capturing the individualized benefit from the good than 
a tax is. Essentially, a cross-subsidy regime may come closer to being a nondis-
tortionary “benefit tax”—a tax that is really just a direct purchase of goods and 
services—than a tax-and-transfer regime. 
1. Benefit Taxes Are Nondistortionary 
The distortion and deadweight loss from taxation (or cross-subsidization) 
exists only to the extent that tax payments differ from the benefit received at the 
margin.166 Where an additional payment leads to additional benefit, the extra cost 
that comes from working more (in the case of income taxation) or paying a higher 
price for the good or service (in the case of cross-subsidization) should not have 
negative behavioral effects, because the individual receives at least as much in 
return for that extra payment.167 To see this, consider the following trivial exam-
ple: Suppose an individual’s payment of $X more in tax leads to farm subsidies 
that make the individual’s groceries exactly $X cheaper. The individual’s after- 
tax earnings go down by $X, but the cost of her consumption bundle also drops 
by $X. There is no net effect on her utility from consumption and therefore no 
additional distortion to her labor effort. 
Although, as the example shows, an income tax can theoretically approximate 
a benefit tax, that approximation is highly unlikely in practice. Income taxation is 
a blunt instrument used to pay for a huge undifferentiated pool of public goods. A 
person would rarely associate the decision to work additional hours (or not) with 
incremental government benefits.168 Cross-subsidies, on the other hand, can be 
more narrowly targeted and flexible, thus creating a clearer connection between 
costs and benefits and leading potentially to less distortion. In the best case, the 
differential prices paid through the cross-subsidies would line up exactly with 
benefits and would therefore be essentially a non-distortive benefit tax—despite 
still being a transfer from those with higher income to fund provision of the good 
for those with lower income.169 
Consider a government mandate that employers provide paid parental leave to 
their employees—an example that Lawrence Summers has used.170 Suppose that 
the cost of providing the leave is $0.10 per hour worked (because the employees 
166. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of 
Taxation, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 513, 514–16 (1996); Margalioth, supra note 4, at 658. 
167. See Craswell, supra note 92, at 369–71. 
168. Cf. H. P. Young et al., Cost Allocation in Water Resources Development, 18 WATER RESOURCES 
RES. 463, 465 (1982) (discussing game-theory problems with assigning costs of collective good among 
self-interested individuals). 
169. Cf. Jolls, Labor Market, supra note 4, at 361–63 (explaining that mandated benefits can increase 
employment, depending on effects of mandate on labor supply and demand curves). 
170. See Summers, supra note 19, at 178–81. For a more detailed model of Summers’s argument, see 
Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance: 
Lessons from Workers’ Compensation Insurance, 5 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 111, 115–17 (1991). 
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earn more leave the more they work). In this case, one would expect in equilib-
rium that hourly wages would fall by $0.10—because the employer is substituting 
the new fringe benefit for wages—but employees that value the benefit would not 
perceive their total compensation to fall by as much. As long as they put some 
positive value on the benefit, the “tax” on their labor is really the difference 
between $0.10 and their subjective value of the benefit.171 In other words, for 
each additional hour worked, they might earn $0.10 less cash than before, but 
they also gain an incremental amount of paid leave—and only the net of the two 
is the real cost to the employee and the source of any distortion and deadweight 
loss.172 In the case where the employee values the paid leave at exactly $0.10 per 
hour, there is no distortion at all.173 
Contrast this with a tax-and-transfer approach. Suppose instead of mandating 
parental leave, the government simply imposed an income tax and used the reve-
nue to pay parents during leave. Even if taxpayers value the benefit, divorcing the 
benefit from the source of funding would cause the full amount of any tax 
increase to be distortionary. Only the cost, not the benefit, would be tied to labor 
market decisions—one could work less or hide income but still receive the same 
benefit. 
In theory, however, costs and benefits could be tied together either at the 
employer level or through government programs. Suppose that the public paren-
tal leave program were financed and provided just like the employer-mandated 
version, with an incremental $0.10 tax on wages (at the employer or employee 
level) and paid leave that increased with hours worked. In that case, we would 
actually not expect any behavioral or distortionary differences between an 
employer mandate and the tax-benefit program. In both cases, an incremental 
hour of work carries the same additional costs (the $0.10 tax) and benefits (the 
incremental leave), and so it should have the same effects on labor market deci-
sions.174 The difficulty for this argument, and for Summers, is that not many gov-
ernment programs are designed that way. Our key assumption is that, under both 
the mandate and the tax-benefit structure, both the value and cost increase 
171. Gruber, supra note 25, at 659–60. Taxes often further sweeten the deal, because in-kind benefits 
are typically exempt from income and payroll tax. See Melese, supra note 108, at 64. 
172. This result holds even if some of the costs of the mandate are passed on to third parties, such as 
consumers. See Jolls, Accommodation, supra note 4, at 239. 
173. See Gruber, supra note 25, at 659–60 (finding no distortion where value to employee equals cost 
to employer). We simplify. Distortions are possible under a variety of conditions, such as if employers 
are constrained to offer similar insurance to low- and high-hour employees. In that case, because low- 
hour workers are made relatively more expensive by the mandate, employers will come to prefer fewer 
workers working more hours. See id. at 661. See generally David M. Cutler & Brigitte C. Madrian, 
Labor Market Responses to Rising Health Insurance Costs: Evidence on Hours Worked, 29 RAND J. 
ECON. 509 (1998) (measuring effect of health costs on hours). 
The mandate case is further helped by the existence of inframarginal workers who may be already 
receiving the benefit. Those employees who value paid leave at more than $0.10 per hour may have 
already negotiated that benefit. The new mandate thus does not affect them at all. Paying for this good 
through an employer mandate thus leads to expansion of the benefit without affecting those already 
receiving it. See infra Section III.C. 
174. See Lester, supra note 4, at 59. 
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proportionately with hours worked. But most government benefits are either flat 
or based on other factors, such as need or cost. In that case, workers pay more 
taxes as their labor effort rises, but their benefit remains fixed, or even declines. 
Workers can dodge taxes or work less and still claim the benefit. 
In other words, what distinguishes a successful benefit tax is not whether it is 
collected by employers or governments, but whether individuals view themselves 
as having to pay the tax to get the benefit. Income taxes typically cannot establish 
this link, because taxpayers believe that their small contribution to the fisc does 
not impact the overall level of services they receive. Their tax payments typically 
cannot be credibly tied to a specific set of benefits or policies.175 Furthermore, the 
income tax plays a particular role in policy discourse, tending to revolve around 
overall revenue needs and broader distributional goals, rather than targeted pro-
gram funding.176 
A counterexample is the payroll tax, which is tightly linked to Social Security and Medicare. 
See e.g., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., HOW YOU EARN CREDITS 1 (2018), https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05- 
10072.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L24-B5LU] (“You qualify for Social Security benefits . . . when you work 
in a job and pay Social Security taxes.”). But this financing system separate from the income tax was 
created precisely to achieve that linkage, which would not have been available if New Deal reformers 
had used the income tax. See MOLLY C. MICHELMORE, TAX AND SPEND: THE WELFARE STATE, TAX 
POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 39 (2012). 
By contrast, an employer mandate (or other form of cross-sub-
sidy, which we discuss further below) can be more tightly bound together with 
some other benefit; cable fees to support libraries will show up on the cable bill if 
a household wants cable, and workplace regulations must be borne to get paid for 
work. 
2. Cross-Subsidies Across Large Pools Can Operate as Benefit Taxes 
The discussion in this section thus far has focused on employer-mandated ben-
efits. But that is just one category of cross-subsidy programs, though a particu-
larly large one. It encompasses not just employer-provided health care but also 
family leave, worker’s compensation insurance, unemployment insurance, mini-
mum wages, and overtime requirements. It also includes programs that, though 
not required to be provided, do come with cross-subsidization rules when pro-
vided, such as ERISA non-discrimination requirements for pensions and retire-
ment plans. It could even include softer forms of mandates, such as when public 
relations pressures or fairness norms drive employers to offer a new benefit to 
everyone in the absence of any legal rule—for example, Starbucks offering its 
employees online education programs through Arizona State University.177 
See Amanda Ripley, The Upwardly Mobile Barista, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (May 2015), https:// 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/05/the-upwardly-mobile-barista/389513 [https://perma. 
cc/3CJP-7B9D]. 
But the benefit taxation argument also extends to other forms of cross-subsidi-
zation.178 For example, consider patent law. As noted above, patent law creates a 
175. Brian Galle & Kirk J. Stark, Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for Preventing State Budget 
Crises, 87 IND. L.J. 599, 626–27 (2012) (discussing challenges in designing mechanisms for credible 
government spending commitments). 
176. 
177. 
178. See Smith, supra note 161, at 658 (applying a similar analysis to the cross-subsidies embedded 
in product warranties). 
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way to fund innovation by essentially charging early consumers of a good a near- 
monopoly price to generate excess returns for the inventor.179 But by definition, 
any person paying that price for the good is likely to be receiving at least as much 
benefit, even at the monopoly price, or else they would not buy the good at all. 
The cross-subsidy for the inventor essentially comes out of the consumer surplus 
of the purchaser, but still leaves that purchaser better off than she was before pur-
chasing. Contrast that with a traditional tax (for example, to fund innovation 
grants) that would fall on everyone, regardless of benefit from the good, leading 
to a net loss for some individuals.180 
This point leads to an additional complication that others, including Summers, 
have not considered in defending employer mandates and other forms of cross- 
subsidization. In particular, the argument above that cross-subsidies can be less 
distortionary than taxes depends in part on how universal or widespread the use 
of the good is. This is a point that we do not believe has appeared in the literature, 
but is an important one to consider in policy design. 
Consider the patent case again. In the example above, we conceive of the pat-
ent as imposing a tax on the consumer to provide an additional transfer to inven-
tors, and we contrast that to, say, an innovation grant program funded out of 
income tax revenues. But a tighter apples-to-apples comparison would actually 
be to a tax on only the consumption of the patented product. Suppose that instead 
of giving patents to Apple on various iPhone components, the government instead 
imposed a sales tax on iPhones, and distributed the proceeds to Apple. Leaving 
aside the optics problem, the two policies would be roughly the same. But we 
have now reintroduced the problem of differential consumption taxation dis-
cussed above. The Atkinson–Stiglitz argument would come back into play: 
wouldn’t it be better to fund this public good (such as it is) with an income tax 
rather than a differential consumption tax? The answer is that it might be, but two 
points deserve more elaboration. 
The first is just that the benefit taxation point is still relevant and can provide 
another counterpoint to the Atkinson–Stiglitz argument. In other words, the dif-
ferential consumption tax is, as Summers said, not the full amount of the addi-
tional cost, but the difference between the cost and the benefit.181 If the benefit 
exceeds the additional cost, then there is not really a “tax,” and it is not clear that 
the Atkinson–Stiglitz argument even applies. For instance, if early adopters of 
iPhones earn huge consumer surpluses from purchase, they may not be deterred 
by the government’s upcharge. 
179. See infra Section II.B. 
180. Monopolies can create deadweight loss, but it is of a different sort than taxes. The deadweight 
loss of monopolies derives from destroying some of the surplus that would exist from exchanges under 
perfect competition; the deadweight loss from taxation (in the simple setting we are discussing) derives 
from shifts away from labor, toward leisure. For an introduction to the economics of monopoly, see 
ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2009). 
181. See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text. 
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Second, this differential cost would not really be differential if the goods were 
universally consumed by consumers who are equally costly to serve. If everyone 
owned an iPhone, then imposing a tax on (or charging monopoly prices for) 
iPhones is really just a lump-sum tax on everyone, and it would not distort con-
sumption or labor market decisions. More realistically, health care is a near-uni-
versal service, and thus building additional costs into the price of health-care 
services would not lead to substitution effects if everyone continued to consume 
health care.182 But this is less true of other goods with more limited consumption, 
such as parental leave and higher education.183 
In the case of parental leave, the benefit of the program is concentrated on cur-
rent or future parents and others with dependents. In the Summers example, the 
assumption is that the generic employee has some positive marginal benefit from 
the program, but many—those without present or future children—will not per-
ceive any subjective benefit at all. To them, the $0.10 per hour cost is entirely a 
“tax.”184 On the one hand, it may be that concentrating the cost of the program on 
those who actually use or anticipate using the program would render it closer to a 
true benefit tax (even if there are still cross-subsidies among differential users). 
On the other hand, charging everyone spreads the cost more widely, lowering the 
per-person cost.185 Implementing this program through the employment system 
may be a good compromise between these two competing effects. The cost is 
imposed on a wider group than merely those who use the program, thus keeping 
per-person costs down, but limited to those who could use the program, thus 
charging those who get at least some insurance benefit even if they never actually 
take advantage of the program. 
In the case of higher education, the United States has long followed a cost- 
sharing model, splitting the costs between the student and the state (and private 
donors).186 This likely reflects some understanding of the large private benefits 
that accrue to the student and the large public externalities that come from having 
an educated population. But even if the average benefit from higher education 
more than offsets the average net tuition, there is substantial variability both 
among former students (especially non-graduates) and across a former student’s 
life cycle. The income-driven student loan programs, such as IBR and PAYE, 
provide for some cross-subsidization from more successful graduates to less  
182. Summers has noted, “In the case of health insurance, a lump sum tax is the appropriate benefit 
tax.” Summers, supra note 19, at 181. 
183. See Gruber, Incidence, supra note 41, at 626 (discussing parental leave). 
184. Cf. Jolls, Accommodation, supra note 4, at 248, 257–60 (showing that mandates applicable to 
fewer than all workers can redistribute across workers); Donohue, supra note 74, at 903–05 (applying 
Jolls’s framework to the sex harassment context). Jolls and Donohue do not explore the argument that 
these transfers are, in effect, differentiated taxes or consider the implications of that fact in an Atkinson– 
Stiglitz framework. 
185. Gruber, Incidence, supra note 41, at 626. 
186. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 100, at 245. 
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successful, as well as from future selves to current selves.187 One of us has argued 
that there should be even greater cross-subsidization, especially because the alter-
native would be to impose additional costs on those who have not had higher edu-
cation.188 But again, this would result in costs being spread less widely and would 
impose differential consumption taxes on some groups and not others. 
These are complex tradeoffs, and there likely is no single right answer. But pol-
icymakers should understand the tradeoffs. Indeed, it may be that the complex 
basket of instruments that we use to fund higher education, for example, reflects 
these difficult tradeoffs and represents a sincere attempt to charge individuals 
something close to their individualized benefit. 
C. REDUCING INEFFECTIVE PAYMENTS 
We now will move on to the third general category of reasons cross-subsidies 
can be efficient. Our argument, which we think we are the first to suggest, is that 
cross-subsidies may be a way of more effectively targeting government subsidies 
and reducing wasteful payments.189 In more technical terms, cross-subsidies may 
reduce payments to “inframarginal” consumers or producers. By trimming out 
useless payments, governments are freed to reduce tax burdens or redirect resour-
ces to more productive uses. 
To show how cross-subsidies solve the problem of inframarginal payments, we 
first have to explain what that problem is. A “marginal” decision is one that is just 
on the knife’s edge of flipping from one choice to another: I am willing to pay up 
to $200 for a new Android phone, and it is priced at $199.99. We call consumers 
“inframarginal” when their decisions are not close to the margin: I would pay up 
to $400 for a smart phone that is selling for $199.99. 
Government payments intended to change or facilitate consumer decisions are 
essentially wasted if the consumer is inframarginal.190 By definition, the 
187. The income-driven repayment programs, like IBR and PAYE, cap monthly payments at a 
percentage of income (usually ten percent of “discretionary income,” which is adjusted gross income 
minus 150 percent of the federal poverty line) and will cancel any outstanding debt after ten to twenty- 
five years, depending on the program. See id. at 251–255, 253 n.136 (describing these programs). As a 
result, borrowers with higher post-graduation income will partially cross-subsidize those with lower 
post-graduation income. 
188. See id. at 269–71. 
189. Summers hints at this argument when he notes that a tax to fund parental leave would cause 
employers with existing leave programs to simply drop their programs, thus leading to more overall 
distortion from the tax. Summers, supra note 19, at 181. However, he does not develop the point further. 
190. Eriksson et al., supra note 55, at 478. We assume, contrary to Kaplow’s analytic approach, that 
the government does not enact a distributively off-setting tax on the class of individuals who are eligible 
to receive the subsidy. See KAPLOW, supra note 14, at 2, 13–34. In that setting, as Kaplow shows, it is 
optimal to ignore inframarginal actors, as net of the tax-only decisions on the margin matter. Id. at 213– 
15. Although we agree with this point, we focus on the more common setting in which offsets are not 
enacted. 
There are some goods the government encourages, such as charity, for which there may be no fixed 
target quantity. In that case, it often will not make sense to describe consumers as inframarginal, because 
even a consumer who was already buying some of the good could be encouraged to buy even more. Our 
point still applies in this setting, however. The claim is that there are some consumers whose choice is 
relatively inelastic, and the goal of the cross-subsidy is to identify more elastic consumers. In the charity 
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inframarginal consumer was already willing and able to buy the good, so the gov-
ernment’s payment does nothing except perhaps enrich that consumer.191 To be 
sure, in some cases enrichment is itself the goal, as in the case of discounted 
access to essential utilities for the poor. But if the goal is simply to encourage 
more consumption of the good, transfers to inframarginal consumers are 
wasteful.192 
Although the exact portion of government spending wasted on inframarginal 
consumers is not known and varies from program to program, there are reasons to 
believe that the dollar figures are large. Chetty and Finkelstein, for example, 
argue that the costs of underwriting inframarginal consumers may be so large in 
the health insurance context that no level of subsidy is justifiable.193 As many as 
nine out of ten buyers who claimed federal credits for energy-efficient appliances 
would have bought such appliances even without the credit.194 
See S´EBASTIEN HOUDE & JOSEPH E. ALDY, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, BELT AND SUSPENDERS AND 
MORE: THE INCREMENTAL IMPACT OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY SUBSIDIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXISTING 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS 3 (2014) http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-14- 
34.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7YM-92A7]. 
Cross-subsidies can sometimes improve on direct government support by bet-
ter targeting subsidy dollars to those whose behavior is most likely to be changed 
by the subsidy.195 That is, in some cases a pool may transfer money from infra-
marginal or inelastic consumers to marginal or elastic ones.196 In that scenario, 
there is a net increase in consumption of the product. An example here might be 
student loan programs, which similarly pool high earners with likely dropouts. 
We might expect that those who later prove to be high earners are for the most 
part aware of the payoff they will earn from college and so are more likely to 
context, for instance, a churchgoer who will tithe ten percent of her income regardless of whether her 
donation is tax-deductible is an inelastic giver. 
191. Subsidies may not even enrich the recipients if producers of the good raise prices to capture the 
subsidy. See, e.g., Steven C. Bourassa et al., Mortgage Interest Deductions and Homeownership: An 
International Survey, 21 J. REAL EST. LITERATURE 181, 197 (2013) (summarizing studies finding that 
though home mortgage interest deductions have a positive impact on ownership, capitalization “has an 
impact on house prices that offsets the tax benefit”). 
192. KOMIVES ET AL., supra note 53, at 13. This is true regardless of whether transfers are funded by 
taxes or cross-subsidies, assuming the cross-subsidy is a departure from the efficient market price. 
Eriksson et al., supra note 55, at 478. 
193. Chetty & Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 120. 
194. 
195. Cf. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution 
of Income, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 979, 984 (1991) (suggesting that an advantage of in-kind provision of 
benefits could be that only those who could not afford to buy benefits on their own consume them). 
196. See Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 4, at 146; cf. Scott Wallsten, Reverse Auctions and Universal 
Telecommunications Service: Lessons from Global Experience, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 373, 379 (2009) 
(criticizing telecommunications policy that transfers funds from elastic to inelastic customers). 
Our argument here is similar to a point originally made by Ronald Coase about the pricing of utilities. 
See R.H. Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA 169 (1946). Coase observed that utility 
customers might respond elastically on the intensive margin—the amount of water they use, for instance— 
but inelastically on the extensive margin decision of whether to connect to the water and sewer system at 
all. See id. at 178. He proposed that a connection fee would therefore be the equivalent of a lump-sum tax, 
and thus more efficient than an income tax as a source of funding for the fixed costs of the utility. Id.; see 
also Hausman, supra note 10, at 43 (applying this framework to subscriber line charges). 
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attend. In contrast, students who are at greatest risk of failing to complete school 
or of failing to earn decent salaries after graduating are marginal, in that some 
may be unlikely to attend college without encouragement and financial support. 
That is, if interest rates reflected individual risks, they could deter marginal stu-
dents from even attending college, thus driving down overall levels of higher edu-
cation. If there is a positive externality for society from every college graduate, 
student loan pools are an effective way to fund that goal: large subsidies for mar-
ginal consumers are financed, in part, through higher payments from inframargi-
nal attendees. Free college, by contrast, would provide subsidies to both marginal 
and inframarginal students and would tax everyone more heavily to pay for it. 
Another version of the targeting argument is that consumption by some mem-
bers of the pool may be more socially valuable than others. There might be cases 
in which transferees, on average, create a larger positive externality for a given 
level of consumption than transferors, so that shifting money from one group to 
the other on net increases consumption of the desirable good. For instance, tele-
communications law funds Internet access for schools and libraries through 
higher fees on other telecom services.197 Arguably, the Internet adds more social 
value when used for research and education than for Netflix.198 If higher fees 
allow for more educational opportunities at the cost of some households skipping 
Game of Thrones,199 then this is a net social gain.200 
A counterargument to both these points might be that, in many cases, targeting 
would be possible without the pool.201 If we know that educational uses are more 
important than entertainment, why not just give schools grants? One answer is 
that pools can allow redistribution even when the government cannot observe 
which members are inframarginal.202 Prior work in the economics of insurance 
markets has shown that the continued success of an insurance pool can offer indi-
rect information about the preferences of some pool participants. Often, if there 
are some insureds who are higher cost but unobservably so ex ante, the insurance 
pool will suffer from adverse selection, and may even collapse into a “death spi-
ral.”203 
For discussion of the “death spiral” phenomenon, see generally David M. Cutler & Richard J. 
Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, in 1 FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH (Alan 
M. Garber ed., 1998), https://www.nber.org/chapters/c9822 [https://perma.cc/4QVY-LYHM]. Markets 
with greater observability or ready access to contract tools are much less prone to adverse selection. See 
Death spirals can be avoided, however, if there are low-cost insureds who 
197. Hausman, supra note 10, at 31 n.11. 
198. But see Stranger Things (Netflix 2016). No, really, you should see it. See supra note 144 (noting 
that Galle is a dork). 
199. Game of Thrones (HBO 2011). 
200. See Cremer et al., supra note 21, at 15 (explaining redistribution, in the context of public 
education and health care, as a means to reduce social inequalities). 
201. See Yew-Kwang Ng, Quasi-Pareto Social Improvements, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 1033, 1042 
(1984) (noting that with sufficient information, government can arrange for direct transfers). 
202. This is related to, but distinct from, the point that governments cannot always observe an 
individual’s ability. See infra Section III.A.1. Cross-subsidies thus help the government overcome its 
inability to observe two different aspects of its citizens: their earning potential and their preferences for 
certain goods. 
203. 
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Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 
1249, 1278 (2004). Insurers can use contract terms, such as copays and deductibles, to screen out high- 
cost customers. See generally Keith J. Crocker & Arthur Snow, Multidimensional Screening in 
Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection, 78 J. RISK & INS. 287 (2011) (explaining how insurers’ use 
of contractual bundling of different levels of risks with different levels of coverage efficiently screens 
insurance applicants, thereby reducing the externality cost of adverse selection). Another route is cost 
control. If average costs per insured of a plan are always lower than consumer demand, there is no 
selection effect. Chetty & Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 118. This is thought to be difficult to achieve. 
204. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 J. RISK 
& INS. 39, 67–68 (2010). For a survey of the empirical evidence, see Chetty & Finkelstein, supra note 3, 
at 124–25. Chetty and Finkelstein argue that this “advantageous selection” leads to over-insurance of 
low-demand individuals. Id. at 125–26. Our argument is that “over-insurance” is potentially efficient in 
cases where the lower demander is higher risk. 
205. This assumes that the quality of the underlying product is held constant. Smith, supra note 161, 
at 666–68. Another possible explanation for continued pool viability is if the low-risk members will 
eventually become high-risk and the pool administrator can credibly promise to continue cross-subsidies 
in that future state. See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk 
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 381–82 (2003) (examining methods such as level premium life 
and disability insurance policies that keep low risks in the pool); see also Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra 
note 203, at 9–10 (noting this possibility). 
Alan Krueger argues that pool administrators may also hold private information that could be 
valuable in targeting benefits. Krueger, supra note 10, at 6–9, 9 n.5. We think in many cases this 
information would also be available if the government funded the program through general revenues and 
simply hired the pool administrator, but perhaps there are certain kinds of information, such as 
confidential employee performance evaluations, where operating the pool together with some other 
function produces economies of scope. 
206. See generally HOMER, THE ILIAD bk. 1 (Peter Green trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 2015) (800 B.C.E.); 
see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 463 (2004). 
207. See Finkelstein et al., supra note 3, at 48 (modeling how pool administrators can use contract 
design to elicit risk preferences). 
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value insurance highly enough to be willing to pay the extra premiums that come 
with belonging to a pool of high-cost customers.204 In effect, some of the con-
sumer surplus from those who are high demanders of insurance is transferred to 
the high-cost customer. The continued existence of the pool is thus evidence that 
high-demand customers exist and are underwriting their costlier neighbors.205 
To see this, consider a worker, Achilles, who knows that he is likely to die rela-
tively young, but no one else can observe that risk.206 Achilles therefore knows 
that if he participates in his employer’s defined-benefit pension program, he is 
effectively subsidizing his colleague, Methuselah, who is expected to collect pen-
sion benefits for many years after retirement. If Achilles gives up salary to partici-
pate in the pension plan anyway, and we assume Achilles is a rational actor, we 
know that Achilles must place a relatively high value on income security during 
whatever (limited) retirement years he will enjoy. We cannot know until his 
untimely passing that Achilles was an inframarginal participant. But Achilles’s 
participation in the pool lowers the total costs of the pool nonetheless. Without 
the pool, the government could not have known that it could pay Achilles less.207 
Not all pools have this feature, but we think a fair number do. As we have just 
suggested, many insurance and retirement benefit systems fit the pattern. Class- 
action lawsuits arguably do, too: if the best plaintiffs remain in the class, instead 
of opting out, that suggests that they value the benefits of aggregate resolution at 
more than the value transferred to their fellow litigants. And these plaintiffs are 
most likely to be inframarginal, as by definition they would have had the best 
chance to succeed on their own. Utilities (and here we include the post office) 
that charge similar rates per unit consumed to all users are another potential 
example. The fixed costs of the system’s infrastructure are, for the most part, 
borne by the heaviest users,208 who presumably are the most likely to belong to 
the network regardless of subsidy and who will remain in the network despite the 
disproportionate charges they bear.209 
Thus far, we have discussed pools that can efficiently route money from infra-
marginal users to more marginal users through cross-subsidies. On the other 
hand, some pools may route money in the opposite direction, subsidizing infra-
marginal users at the expense of the marginal. Net neutrality rules may have 
something of this flavor. Net neutrality prohibits Internet providers from, among 
other things, charging heavy-usage customers higher rates.210 Although the ulti-
mate impact of the rule depends on several technological and other details, in 
some settings it has the effect of subsidizing the heavy-usage customers at the 
expense of others.211 Even assuming that there are sound policy reasons for 
encouraging Internet access—network externalities, for instance—this would be 
a silly way to do it.212 The heavy users presumably would demand Internet even 
without subsidies, whereas the burden of the cross-subsidy reduces the demand 
for Internet among those casual users who are most likely to be deterred by the 
higher cost. 
Finally, even some pools that do not redistribute between inframarginal and 
marginal consumers in either direction might be questionable policy choices. As 
we discussed in section I.B, cross-subsidies imposed on goods with positive 
externalities diminish production of the externality by the transferors. This distor-
tion could wipe out any gains from transferees’ new externality production. 
When transferors are mostly inframarginal or otherwise inelastic consumers, this 
problem is diminished: the higher cost does not reduce the transferors’ consump-
tion, preserving its spillover benefits.213 But if there is no correlation between 
208. See Daniel A. Lyons, Internet Policy’s Next Frontier: Usage-Based Broadband Pricing, 66 
FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2013) (noting the mobile phone industry uses usage-based pricing, which can 
shift network costs onto the heaviest users); David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies in 
Telecommunications: Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 11 YALE J. ON 
REG. 119, 132 (1994). 
209. Kahn, supra note 76, at 144–45. 
210. Rebecca Curwin, Note, Unlimited Data, but a Limited Net: How Zero-Rated Partnerships 
Between Mobile Service Providers and Music-Streaming Apps Violate Net Neutrality, 17 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 204, 209–10 (2015). 
211. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 
1853–54 (2006) (noting that net neutrality “allows high-volume users to impose costs on low-volume 
users, in effect requiring the latter to subsidize the former”); see also Christopher S. Yoo, Network 
Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 203. 
212. We do not mean to say that net neutrality lacks other virtues, only that it is not a sensible 
financing mechanism for network externalities. 
213. See Shaviro, supra note 55, at 422. 
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inelastic demand and being a transferor—if transferors can be marginal or infra-
marginal alike—this problem remains. 
D. HIDDEN AND OFF-BUDGET TAXES 
A final set of situations where cross-subsidies may be an improvement over the 
traditional income tax is where any tax embedded in the cross-subsidy is some-
what hidden. We see two main analytical subcategories here. First, the cross- 
subsidy could be hidden in a private or micro sense: the cross-subsidy may simply 
be less salient to an individual and therefore less likely to lead to behavioral dis-
tortions. Second, the cross-subsidy could be hidden in a public or macro sense: 
using an off-budget and non-tax instrument might overcome some of the eco-
nomic, political, and procedural barriers faced by tax instruments. 
1. Hidden Taxes and Salience 
In section III.B, we discussed how cross-subsidy mechanisms can be designed 
to approximate benefit taxes and therefore can avoid some of the worst distortion-
ary effects of taxation. But even if the cross-subsidy is in effect an income tax, or 
close to it, it may still be less distortionary if it is less salient to the individual. If 
an individual does not consider the cross-subsidy in the same way that she consid-
ers an income tax when making labor market decisions, then the cross-subsidy 
would cause less behavioral distortion. 
For example, consider the income-based subsidies for the ACA or the income- 
driven student loan payments under IBR and PAYE.214 Because these subsidies 
are income-based, they can potentially create the same sort of incentives as an 
income tax. Just as an individual might try to mimic a low-income person to 
avoid paying income tax (for example, by working less, substituting for non- 
taxed forms of compensation, or simply hiding income), so might a person do the 
same to lower their out-of-pocket health insurance premium or student loan pay-
ment.215 But there is some reason to think that individuals would treat the pro-
grams at least somewhat differently even if they offered income-based payments 
that exactly mimicked an individual’s income tax payments.216 
First, the timing of payments could affect payors’ behavioral responses. The 
ACA and student loan programs are based in most cases on the prior year’s 
income. The separation in time between earning the income and calculating the 
214. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
215. The ACA and IBR and PAYE programs are not exactly equivalent to income taxes. In 
particular, they are much less progressive, especially at the higher end. Unless someone has relatively 
low income already (less than 400 percent of the poverty line for the ACA, see I.R.C. § 36B, or a “partial 
financial hardship” under IBR or PAYE, in which the standard loan service payment exceeds ten percent 
of the difference between the borrower’s adjusted gross income and 150 percent of the relevant poverty 
level, see 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(5)), then appearing to have lower income will not affect their premium 
or loan payments. 
216. For empirical support, see generally Keith Marzilli Ericson & Judd B. Kessler, The Articulation 
of Government Policy: Health Insurance Mandates Versus Taxes, 124 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 43, 43– 
45 (2016) (reporting survey evidence that individuals were more likely to comply with a “mandate” to 
buy insurance than with a penalty tax for failing to purchase). 
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income-based payment could lead to some discounting of the effects: earners 
would have to anticipate the impact of next year’s student loan payment on their 
current year’s incentives to work.217 By contrast, income taxes are withheld from 
paychecks or perhaps paid quarterly through estimated taxes or business fil-
ings.218 Similarly, cross-subsidization payments that are infrequent or irregular 
should have less of an effect on life-cycle driven choices about career and income 
paths. Subsidized student loan payments are nice, but taking a lower-paying job 
just to reduce loan payments will often be counter-productive when the loan pay-
ments are only for a fixed number of years. 
Second, the form in which these cross-subsidies appear could make them less 
salient to individuals, and thus less likely to alter behavior. For example, the cost 
of the cross-subsidy could appear as a lower quality or level of service.219 
Spending that could make Internet speed faster or college classes smaller instead 
goes to subsidize rural Internet access and financial aid, respectively. These op-
portunity costs could potentially be less salient to payors than explicit fees added 
to an Internet or tuition bill. 
Furthermore, even if the cross-subsidy is baked into the price, there is some 
evidence that consumers respond differently, and sometimes more powerfully, to 
a tax or fee than to a mere price increase. This could be because the public debate 
and media coverage of a tax increase is greater than for a price increase, making 
it more salient for individuals.220 Alternatively, a tax increase could be more per-
sistent than volatile market price movements and thus be more likely to affect 
long-term decisions. Finally, for some, there is a negative valence and rhetoric 
around taxes that does not attach to other policy instruments. In these and similar 
cases, hiding what is, in effect, a redistributional tax into the price of a good may 
be more efficient than taxing. 
That said, in some situations, the presentation of the cross-subsidy could 
actually be more salient. Income taxes are thought to affect behavior because of 
their effects on consumption. If the subsidy (or extra payment) for a good just 
appears in an annual tax bill, it could have some effect on consumption of that 
good. But when the subsidy (or extra payment) is baked right into the price of the 
good, it is likely to be much starker. For example, Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and 
Kory Kroft have shown that consumers are more responsive to sales taxes 
217. There is evidence that individuals engage in “hyperbolic discounting”—applying a high and 
increasing discount rate to future events, beyond what a simple “rational” discounting theory would 
predict. See, e.g., Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 
J. ECON. LIT. 351, 360 (2002). Other findings suggest that taxpayers fail to properly discount future tax 
changes. See Sebastien Bradley, Inattention to Deferred Increases in Tax Bases: How Michigan Home 
Buyers Are Paying for Assessment Limits, 99 REV. ECON. & STATS. 53, 53–54 (2017). 
218. Of course these timing differences are not inherent to the instruments. Premiums and loan 
payments could instead adjust weekly based on income, just like tax withholding. But our point is that 
these sorts of design choices have first-order effects, and that cross-subsidies often provide the 
additional flexibility to more easily incorporate efficient design choices. 
219. Smith, supra note 161, at 649. 
220. See Shanjun Li et al., Gasoline Taxes and Consumer Behavior, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 
302, 316 (2014) (describing evidence for this effect). 
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displayed on the shelves than sales taxes computed at the register.221 Although 
this type of salience may not affect labor market decisions, it is likely to affect 
consumption decisions. 
To summarize, if a cross-subsidy comes across as less salient to an individual 
than an equivalent tax, it will be a more efficient funding mechanism, all else 
equal. But whether that is the case is ultimately an empirical question. The impor-
tance of salience in evaluating tax policy is now well-understood, and salience is 
a frequent topic of empirical study.222 That work should also be brought to bear 
on cross-subsidization regimes. 
2. Off-Budget and Non-Tax Instruments 
Financing policies through cross-subsidies rather than through taxes may also 
affect the likelihood that the policy will be enacted and sustained over time. 
Budgeting systems play several key roles in the political economy of most gov-
ernments. Budgets can serve as a visible means of public accountability for offi-
cials, revealing their priorities and obliging them to impose taxes sufficient to pay 
for their policy choices.223 Budget systems also tend to create “vetogates” or 
choke points where a small number of officials can block legislative action.224 
Cross-subsidies potentially sidestep all these limits.225 
The public accountability function of budgets plays a central role in other legal 
debates. In each of these contexts, courts or scholars argue that the need to raise 
tax revenues to pay for government acts as an important check on government 
actors, forcing the government to take some account of the cost of its decisions.226 
Sometimes, though, we might want to make government action easier, such as 
221. See generally Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1145 (2009). 
222. See, e.g., id.; Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q.J. ECON. 969 
(2009). See generally David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market 
Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19 (2011) (providing a survey of these studies). 
223. JAMES J. GOSLING, BUDGETARY POLITICS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS 117 (5th ed. 2009); JOHN 
W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 106–08 (2d ed. 2003); Elizabeth Garrett, 
Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 871, 925–26 (1999) (noting organized groups follow budget process closely “and will hold 
representatives accountable if they fail to enact federal programs that benefit them”); Posner, supra note 
2, at 43–44. 
224. For development of the “vetogate” concept, see GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK 17–64 (2002), and for a shorter overview of both vetogates and veto 
players, see Mark Hallerberg, Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysis and Institutional 
Effectiveness, in REFORM PROCESSES AND POLICY CHANGE: VETO PLAYERS AND DECISION-MAKING IN 
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 21, 21–29 (Thomas Ko¨nig et al. eds., 2010). 
225. See Gruber, supra note 25, at 663 (noting that insurance mandates are “politically appealing” in 
“era of tight fiscal budget constraints”). 
226. See Printz v. United States, 512 U.S. 898, 930 (1997); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 620–22 (1984); 
Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 
420 (1977); D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process—the 
Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 644–46 (1985); see also 
PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 55–81 (1983) 
(describing relationship between fiscal exposure and government accountability). 
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when a cohesive lobbying group is likely to block legislation that is good for the 
public at large. In those cases, allowing regulators to move items “off budget” 
might be the better choice.227 There are, however, serious empirical questions 
about whether budgets really play the key role in limiting or easing government 
action that these debates assume.228 
We are more confident in the role budget rules play in creating “vetogates” and 
other obstacles to legislative action. Inertia is a potent political force, particularly 
when those with power to block progress hold divergent views.229 Policies that 
require continual legislative renewal are unlikely to survive in the long term, and 
those that must run a gauntlet of vetogates are unlikely to come into existence in 
the first place.230 The congressional budgeting process offers useful examples. 
Some federal programs are structured as “entitlements” and are automatically 
funded, whereas others must be affirmatively provided with funding each year in 
an annual appropriations bill.231 Appropriations bills historically have had to first 
pass through a small subject-matter committee before coming to the floor for a 
vote.232 Entitlements, not surprisingly, are far more likely to maintain their fund-
ing over time than programs subject to annual appropriations.233 Furthermore, in 
the Senate, legislation that lacks any budget effect, or that results in a net addition 
to the federal deficit of more than $5 billion, requires sixty votes rather than 
fifty.234 Large programs requiring massive annual on-budget expenditures are 
therefore prone to “raids” because, by cutting them, a new proposal can create 
savings to offset new expenditures.235 Off-budget programs take more votes to 
enact, but are not subject to raids and are more difficult to repeal. 
227. See John R. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, 104 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1084–88 (2016); Brian Galle, 
Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 922 n.216 (2008); see also Kaplow, supra note 
69, at 529–31 (suggesting that requiring the government to pay compensation when it regulates can 
result in overproduction of negative externalities by private parties). 
228. See Galle, supra note 227, at 921–30; Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, 
Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 355–57 (2000); John 
Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1593–95 (2017); 
Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 
1144, 1151–56 (2016); cf. Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law 
and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1121–23 (2016) (observing that claims about relative political 
salience of different forms of redistributive transfers assume a baseline of transparency that may not 
exist); Hallerberg, supra note 224, at 38 (predicting that government officials do not fully internalize 
budget effects of their decisions). 
229. See TSEBELIS, supra note 224, at 165. 
230. See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 756 (2012) (offering overview of vetogates and exploring their ramifications for the legislative 
process). 
231. See George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal 
Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 183 (2009). 
232. Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Government, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 721 (2000). 
233. See GOSLING, supra note 223, at 145. 
234. Yin, supra note 231, at 215–16, 224; see also Garrett, supra note 232, at 719–20 (discussing the 
“reconciliation” process in which some bills do not need to pass sixty-vote threshold). 
235. See Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative 
Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 878 (2002) (describing revenue offset process). 
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Placing programs off budget, then, can serve as an important tool to commit 
the government in the future, although this move can also be spun as a negative. 
It is exceptionally important, but exceptionally difficult, for legislatures to com-
mit themselves.236 Because off-budget programs are effectively entitlements, are 
not subject to raids, and require sixty votes for repeal, they are far more likely to 
survive future political opposition than programs that are on-budget. Off-budget 
programs may be a rare tool Congress has for making credible promises.237 On 
the other hand, this durability has potential downsides, such as greater error 
costs.238 
Off-budget financing also allows the government to pay for public goods even 
when there are some strictures on traditional tax instruments. The notion here is 
that traditional taxes and public spending may be held below their social optimum 
because of constraints on government action, and non-tax instruments can help to 
fill the gap.239 Two primary examples illustrate this principle. First, governments 
may feel constrained by the economics of interjurisdictional competition to keep 
their taxes and spending lower than they or their citizens would prefer. This will 
be especially true at the state level in the United States but can also apply at the 
federal level. Second, there may be formal (at the state level) and informal (at the 
federal level) budget constraints on governments that limit their ability to use on- 
budget forms of financing.240 
Regarding competition, the typical view in the literature is that fiscal competi-
tion between states will exert downward pressure on tax rates.241 At the state 
level, mobility of individuals and businesses may make it tempting for a state to 
try to attract high-income individuals and businesses with lower tax rates.242 At 
the national level, the mobility of capital, especially financial and intellectual 
capital, exerts a similar pressure on corporate tax rates.243 Overall levels of 
236. Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1023–24, 1063–64 (2011). 
237. But cf. Yin, supra note 231, at 233 (arguing that automatically-expiring legislation may be more 
predictable during its lifespan because opponents will likely wait until expiration to oppose). Because 
the alternative we consider here is annual appropriations, not automatic expiration, Yin’s argument does 
not have much force in our context. 
Our analysis in this section assumes that the cross-subsidy is enacted by Congress, but cross-subsidies 
may also arise through regulatory action. See Posner, supra note 2, at 47. We reserve discussion of the 
administrative law implications of this phenomenon for later work. 
238. Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 267–72 (2007). But see Kysar, 
supra note 236, at 1041–56 (calling into question the purported benefits of sunset provisions and 
discussing disadvantages of temporary legislation relative to lasting legislation). 
239. Brooks, supra note 227, at 1084–86. 
240. Cf. Theodore J. Stumm & Aman Khan, Effects of Utility Enterprise Fund Subsidization on 
Municipal Taxes and Expenditures, 28 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 103, 112 (1996) (observing that local 
utility revenues can allow municipal governments to spend in excess of property-tax limits imposed by 
state). 
241. See, e.g., John R. Brooks II, Fiscal Federalism as Risk-Sharing: The Insurance Role of 
Redistributive Taxation, 68 TAX L. REV. 89, 111–20 (2014). 
242. See id. (reviewing theory and evidence on state-level redistributions). 
243. For discussion of the international competition for the corporate tax base, including competition 
over the legal definition of “competition,” see Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Trouble with Tax Competition: 
From Practice to Theory, 71 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
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taxation and public spending may then end up being lower than a worldwide 
social planner would choose. If cross-subsidies are more hidden and less salient 
to individuals and businesses, then they may help to close the gap between the 
actual and optimal levels of taxation and public spending.244 This is, in part, an 
expansion of the salience point in the prior subsection,245 but it considers the 
effects of salience on shifting of income between jurisdictions, as opposed to the 
overall level of income. 
It is an open question whether and how much competition has these effects, 
however. Some states do not seem all that constrained in their ability to increase 
traditional taxes. Moreover, other fiscal federalism forces may push the other 
way. For example, states may in some situations over-tax relative to the optimum, 
because many of the negative effects of taxation fall on individuals and busi-
nesses outside of a given state. But these sorts of vertical fiscal externalities may, 
in turn, cause federal tax rates to be too low, because that is where many of these 
externalities fall.246 If a state has “too high” of a state corporate tax rate, because 
it does not pay the full price for the effects of that tax, then the federal corporate 
tax rate may have to compensate to avoid, for example, driving a corporation 
overseas.247 If the federal government is so constrained, again, more hidden forms 
of taxation may help to close the gap. 
E. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to the factors we have discussed so far, policymakers will also want 
to take into account other considerations that affect whether policies succeed or 
fail. As we emphasized earlier, we see the cross-subsidy question as mostly an 
issue of financing. A cross-subsidy can usually be integrated with any combina-
tion of other design features. For instance, if legislatures want to pay for innova-
tion through cross-subsidies but prefer to deliver those subsidies before a product 
comes to market, they can provide innovators with up-front government grants, 
financed through an excise fee (equivalent in cost to a patent monopolist’s 
markup) collected during the first twenty years a product is on the market. In this 
subsection, however, we highlight three design features that may be inherent to 
cross-subsidies, such that if policymakers dislike these features, they might have 
to choose taxpayer financing instead. In particular, in designing cross-subsidy 
pools, policymakers need to consider issues of progressivity, incentives, and the 
features of the pool itself. 
244. See Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 105–07 (2009) (making this argument 
about low-salience taxes at the state level). 
245. See supra Section III.D.1. 
246. See Robin Boadway et al., The Consequences of Overlapping Tax Bases for Redistribution and 
Public Spending in a Federation, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 453, 454 (1998); Roger H. Gordon & Julie Berry 
Cullen, Income Redistribution in a Federal System of Governments, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 1100, 1103, 1108 
(2012). 
247. Cf. David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in the United 
States, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 295, 307–08 (2017). 
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1. Progressivity 
Our defense of cross-subsidies has centered on the possibility that they may 
distribute on a basis other than income, but transfers within a pool may also result 
in transfers from rich to poor or vice-versa. Some of these transfers may be desir-
able. Individuals with disabilities are typically poorer in our society, so antidiscri-
mination rules that protect those with disabilities also tend to increase the overall 
progressivity of government transfers.248 
In some cases, cross-subsidies might favor the poor but to a lesser degree 
than the general tax system does.249 In those instances, relying on cross-subsi-
dies reduces progressivity, compared to the alternative of tax financing.250 
Some commentators criticize the ACA on this basis, pointing out that the 
cross-subsidies younger men provide usually do not increase much with income, 
so that blue-collar workers bear a heavier proportionate burden than their white- 
collar supervisors.251 
See, e.g., John Goodman, Six Problems with the ACA that Aren’t Going Away, HEALTH AFFAIRS 
BLOG (June 25, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/06/25/six-problems-with-the-aca-that-arent- 
going-away [https://perma.cc/9KAQ-4LXE]. 
Because men tend to outearn women, there is still some pro-
gressivity in these transfers,252 
Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2015, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 
(Nov. 2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-earnings/2015/home.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
J5VT-TQYE]. 
but relying on general tax revenues would be more 
progressive. 
Louis Kaplow has argued that these progressivity side-effects should not be a 
reason to either enact or oppose non-tax policies.253 Instead, he suggests that 
unwanted regressivity can be corrected, and desirable progressivity achieved, 
through the income tax.254 For instance, if cross-subsidies leave one class of indi-
viduals richer on average, tax rates could be raised for that group. If that is unreal-
istic, he says, we should evaluate policies with progressivity implications in two 
steps: first, is it good policy, and second, would we want to enact a tax reform 
with these progressivity features?255 In our eyes, he does not take a clear position 
on what policymakers should do if their answers to these two questions conflict. 
Our view is that progressivity can at least be a reason to support a cross- 
subsidy. As we have shown, cross-subsidies sometimes achieve wealth redistribu-
tion more efficiently than the income tax, such as when being in the pool is a 
“tag” for ability or when cross-subsidization enables governments to undertake 
248. See MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES: 2010, at 11–12 (2012). 
249. See Gruber, Incidence, supra note 41, at 640 (noting that improving maternity health benefit 
subsidies can result in “large welfare losses”); Kaserman & Mayo, supra note 208, at 139 (explaining 
under the current system of cross-subsidization, that there is “no means of assuring that either the payers 
or payees of the subsidies are the desired or deserving groups”). 
250. KOMIVES ET AL., supra note 53, at 19, 132–133; Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 4, at 146–47. 
251. 
252. 
253. KAPLOW, supra note 14, at 16–19 & 17 n.7. 
254. Id. at 20–21. 
255. Id. at 29–32; see also Cremer et al., supra note 21, at 22–23 (modeling comparison of 
distributive effects of cross-subsidy versus direct cash subsidy). 
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or commit to more redistribution than they could using an income tax alone. We 
also think that unwanted regressivity (or excessive progressivity, conceivably) 
could sometimes be reason to oppose a cross-subsidy proposal. If no correcting 
tax reform will or could realistically be bundled together with the cross-subsidy, 
society must be willing to accept that the cross-subsidy’s distributive consequen-
ces are a price to be paid for other goals. 
2. Polluter Pays 
Cross-subsidies also have implications for the government’s choice of how to 
design incentives, such as the decision whether to reward or punish. Although 
commentators usually favor punishment,256 Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest have 
argued for “carrots” rather than “sticks” in some situations.257 They rely on much 
the same arguments we describe in section II.A. If society uses carrots to change 
behavior, the cost of the carrot will typically be borne by all taxpayers, whereas a 
stick burdens just the bad actor.258 In essence, Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest argue 
that the costs of government incentives should be financed through the income 
tax, rather than by transfers among a pool of individuals who might both cause 
and be harmed by each other’s acts. 
Although their account is in many ways persuasive, we would further highlight 
the possible role of moral hazard. Beginning, at least, with Ronald Coase, most 
commentators have argued that actors who create harms for others should be 
penalized, rather than being paid to stop.259 Just as insurance may induce those 
with coverage to take on excess risk, paying the polluter gives others the perverse 
incentive to begin polluting so that they too can be paid.260 Even where this 
dynamic is not present, sticks encourage externality producers to anticipate future 
regulation.261 Thus, governments should prefer cross-subsidy financing where 
that choice tends to leave wrongdoers responsible for paying the bill. 
That said, intermediate options may be better than either pure sticks (cross- 
subsidies) or pure carrots (tax financing).262 Most insurance contracts aim to 
strike an optimal balance between the risk-spreading benefits of coverage and the 
moral hazard detriments.263 Usually, drafters accomplish this goal by requiring 
256. Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 
675, 686 (1992); Cameron Hepburn, Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or Both: A Review of Instrument 
Choice, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 226, 228–29 (2006). 
257. Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrots and the Decline of Sticks, 80 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 341, 367–69, 372–73 (2013). 
258. Id. at 366. 
259. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in 
Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 726–27 (1999). 
260. Id. 
261. Kaplow, supra note 69, at 527–30. 
262. Cf. CALABRESI, supra note 59, at 64–67 (arguing for a balance between risk-spreading and 
accident prevention). 
263. David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of Health Insurance, in 1A HANDBOOK 
OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 563, 586–97 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000); Mark V. 
Pauly, Taxation, Health Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical Economy, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 629, 
640 (1986). 
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the insured to bear some of the costs, while the insurer picks up the “tail risk,” the 
risk of disastrous losses. Copays and deductibles are common examples.264 
Similarly, an optimal government financing mechanism might rely partly on 
cross-subsidies and partly on tax revenue.265 For instance, takings law usually 
grants either full or zero compensation to condemned properties.266 An arguably 
better outcome, at least in the case of property taken to prevent negative external-
ities, would be to provide partial compensation (assuming that parties cannot 
themselves spread the risk of takings through private arrangements).267 This 
would mitigate the property owner’s downside risk while also still maintaining 
owners’ incentives to cure spillovers before they happen, thereby preventing the 
need for the taking.268 
3. The Scope of the Pool 
A final point, perhaps obvious but still important, is that cross-subsidies by 
their nature typically operate only within pools. Payors who lack resources or 
who are too willing to flee the pool if asked to cross-subsidize others cannot be 
used as a base of support.269 In addition, that benefits are delivered through a pool 
often means that beneficiaries have limited choices. Unless the benefit is readily 
marketable, the transferee of a cross-subsidy must be willing to accept the pooled 
good to collect any transfer. 
Most recipients would likely prefer to receive cash transfers,270 but there can 
be solid economic reasons for delivering benefits in kind rather than in cash. In 
addition to the optimal-tax reasons we described earlier, policymakers may want 
to target resources to goods that produce externalities, paternalistically believe 
that beneficiaries underconsume some goods, or conclude in-kind transfers 
reduce fraud.271 In-kind provision also may be necessary for goods that could not 
readily be purchased, such as insurance products subject to serious moral hazard 
problems.272 Failing any of these arguments, though, paying through a pool may 
generate extra deadweight loss to the extent that recipients value the pooled good 
less than they would some other use of the same funds. 
Pools may also fail to reach some beneficiaries. Subsidized water and power 
are only useful to households that can connect to the pipes or wires.273 Rules 
264. See Baker, supra note 205, at 374. 
265. See supra notes 216–21 and accompanying text. 
266. See Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L.J. 110, 
116–17, 123 (2002). 
267. See id. at 131–33. As we mentioned earlier, in the presence of private risk spreading, 
government efforts to spread risk are unnecessary and usually inefficient. See Kaplow, supra note 69, at 
541, 583–84. 
268. Kaplow, supra note 69, at 583. 
269. KOMIVES ET AL., supra note 53, at 16–17. 
270. See Currie & Gahvari, supra note 136, at 338. 
271. See id. at 338–47, 369–73; KAPLOW, supra note 14, at 175–78. 
272. See Currie & Gahvari, supra note 136, at 372 (noting that government may have to provide 
goods subject to market failure). 
273. KOMIVES ET AL., supra note 53, at 74–77. 
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requiring builders to make twenty percent of new units affordable will provide, at 
best, indirect support to tenants already residing in affordable but low-quality 
housing.274 To be sure, many transfers also produce externalities. Network 
effects, for instance, make telecommunications networks more useful as more 
enroll (to a point).275 Our point is only that cross-subsidies can often only spur 
these externalities by reaching individuals within the pool, and this group may be 
fewer than all the people who might benefit from a tax-funded project. 
IV. EXAMPLES 
We now illustrate our analysis through a series of brief case studies. In all of 
these examples, we take the underlying distributive choice as given. That is, we 
accept for the sake of argument that society wants to transfer resources to women, 
the injured, or inventors. Our limited question is whether this transfer should be 
effected through taxes and transfers or instead through cross-subsidies. 
A. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
In light of our analysis, we now would argue that key portions of the ACA are 
not only politically pragmatic, but also likely efficient. In particular, the ACA’s 
drafters probably correctly chose to finance better care for women and the sick 
through “guaranteed issue” and “community rating” rules rather than via a gen-
eral income tax.276 
Although we focus primarily on the impact of guaranteed issue and community rating, our 
analysis could also be important to other aspects of the ACA. For example, the ACA included a 
significant expansion of Medicaid. See Affordable Care Act, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/ 
affordable-care-act/index.html [https://perma.cc/KH9R-2BXZ] (last visited Apr. 10, 2018). Prior to 
Medicaid expansion, many individuals were able to obtain health care, but the economic burden of their 
unpaid health bills was distributed across other actors in the health system. Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and 
Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 
31–32 (2010). Medicaid shifts these costs to the federal taxpayer and, in small part, to state taxpayers. 
See generally Amy Finkelstein et al., What Does (Formal) Health Insurance Do, and for Whom? (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23718, 2017). Medicaid’s key impact, then, is not 
necessarily to expand health insurance coverage, but rather to change how it is financed, from cross- 
subsidy to income tax. 
Although there remain some empirical uncertainties, critics of 
the ACA should engage more carefully with its potentially pro-efficiency 
choices. 
First, the ACA combines benefit taxation and targeting of inframarginal 
purchasers in a way that tends to minimize the distortionary impact of its cross- 
subsidies. Individuals who obtain a large consumer surplus from actuarially fairly 
priced health insurance should still view its purchase as a bargain, even at a 
274. In addition, although cross-subsidies may improve payees’ welfare, they may also increase the 
cash outlay necessary to enter the pool. Craswell, supra note 92, at 395–96. For instance, housing codes 
might transfer resources to residents in the lowest-quality homes, but also raise the prices of those homes 
(whether by more or less than the welfare gain). This creates a liquidity barrier for potential 
beneficiaries. 
275. S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 133, 138–40 (1994); see also KOMIVES ET AL., supra note 53, at 2–3 (noting that 
water and sanitation expenditures improve educational attainment and overall productivity). 
276. 
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higher price. If Ricky Riskaverse277 values his $2,000 annual insurance policy at 
$5,000, he will still be willing to purchase it even if it costs $3,000.278 The obliga-
tion is nationwide and applies to everyone, so there are few margins of behavior 
that it might distort, and shifting to general tax revenues would not much broaden 
the tax base.279 Although some employees do not value insurance and some 
employers may find it particularly expensive to provide,280 overall the social costs 
of financing insurance will plausibly be lower than under an income tax. 
A key question for individuals who get their health insurance at work, how-
ever, is whether employers may have already extracted this surplus.281 If 
Visecorp knows that Ricky values his policy at $5,000, they might be able to 
squeeze Ricky to exchange it for $5,000 in salary, rather than $2,000. A mandate 
that raised annual premiums to $3,000 would then leave Ricky worse off (assum-
ing he could not renegotiate his salary upwards).282 
But it seems unlikely employers would be able to capture all employee surplus. 
For one, this surplus is essentially unobservable, making it difficult for employers 
to make offers tailored to particular employee preferences.283 For another, tax, 
labor and employment law, the nature of job markets, and contracting-cost con-
straints oblige most employers to use relatively uniform bundles of pay and bene-
fits, preventing the fine tailoring of compensation awards to individual employee 
preferences.284 At best, employers have likely captured only a fraction of the 
277. Try saying that five times fast. 
278. For an application of Summers’s model to the ACA context, see Jonathan T. Kolstad & Amanda 
E. Kowalski, Mandate-Based Health Reform and the Labor Market: Evidence from the Massachusetts 
Reform, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 81, 83–85 (2016). 
279. Other provisions of the ACA may reduce this pro-efficiency component, however. Again, a key 
aspect of the benefit tax story is that obtaining health insurance through work offers employees 
something they cannot get on their own. The ACA offers subsidies for individuals who cannot obtain 
insurance through their employer, as long as the individual is in a household under 400 percent of the 
federal poverty level. See I.R.C. § 36B. These policies must be community rated and, thus, they also 
carry a cross-subsidy. But if the individual is subsidized, the government pays for both the insurance, in 
part, and the cross-subsidy. Giving up these subsidies would be a cost of accepting employer insurance, 
partially breaking the tax-benefit link on which our argument depends. See Gruber, supra note 25, at 
663–64. 
280. See Gruber, supra note 25, at 663. 
281. See id. at 657; cf. Jolls, Labor Market, supra note 4, at 363, 372 (noting that, in functioning 
markets, employers will already have provided benefits that are worth more than their cash cost to 
employees, but pointing out that adverse selection issues may prevent this for health insurance). 
282. See Margalioth, supra note 4, at 683. 
283. Gruber, supra note 25, at 656; cf. Jolls, Labor Market, supra note 4, at 378 (making this point 
about mandated medical leave). But see MARK V. PAULY, HEALTH BENEFITS AT WORK: AN ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 90 (1997) (arguing that 
employers know that older workers value health insurance more highly and that laws limiting the 
resulting age discrimination are hard to enforce). 
284. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Effect of Anti-Discrimination Provisions on Rank-and-File 
Compensation, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 599–600 (1994) (discussing uniform benefits for both “rank-and- 
file” and “highly compensated” employees); Gruber, supra note 25, at 656 (explaining “employers are 
unable to set completely employee-specific compensation packages, offering insurance to some workers 
and not to others”); Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 10, at 339–40 (discussing benefits of distributing 
benefits and costs among both beneficiary and non-beneficiary employees); see Jolls, Labor Market, 
supra note 4, at 380 (observing that “wage stickiness” may prevent employers from fully adjusting 
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average surplus, leaving room for the ACA to further target inframarginal pur-
chasers.285 Thus, Kolstad and Kowalski, analyzing the Massachusetts precursor 
to the ACA, report that, based on the benefit tax aspect alone, the mandate pro-
duced between two percent and twenty-six percent as much deadweight loss as a 
comparable tax.286 
Next, the ACA reduces the need for distortive tax revenues, and its cross- 
subsidies likely do not motivate behaviors that overlap with responses to the 
income tax.287 Few efforts to reduce reported taxable income could affect health 
insurance premiums. Community rating does not offer much reason to work 
“off the books” because, one way or another, the worker must still carry insur-
ance, and that insurance will come with cross-subsidies. To the extent that 
cross-subsidies in insurance increase with health, most individuals are prob-
ably unwilling to get sick to reduce their contributions, making the cross- 
subsidy similar to a tax on earning ability.288 
On the other hand, tax penalties for failing to carry health insurance are essen-
tial to the community rating scheme and are, in part, based on income.289 They 
also are enforced mostly through withholding tax refunds—a mechanism that 
could be avoided if workers never file tax returns.290 However, the originally 
enacted penalties were, on average, considerably smaller than the cost of the 
cross-subsidy.291 Although this may limit their effectiveness, it also limits the  
salary to offset benefits). Thus, for example, it is difficult for employers to observe employee surplus 
through the use of “menus” of compensation with differing mixes of cash and benefits. However, there 
may be some stratification at the firm level, with some employers offering benefits and attracting those 
who value the benefits, and with others paying in cash. Bankman, supra, at 610. 
285. See Gruber, supra note 25, at 656–57 (explaining that under realistic conditions, workers will 
retain surplus equal to their subjective value, minus the market-wide equilibrium wage differential). 
286. Kolstad & Kowalski, supra note 278, at 94. 
287. Other provisions of the ACA might affect the informal economy, but we focus here on 
community rating and guaranteed issue. For instance, the so-called “employer mandate” affects firms 
with fifty or more employees, which adds to the firm’s interest in shifting some workers off the books. 
See id. at 83 (modeling impact of employer mandate on labor demand). This mandate is part of a 
collection of rules aimed at holding down costs for the subsidies given to low-income households to 
purchase insurance on the non-group market, David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax 
Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed To Prevent Avoidable Costs to 
Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 690–700, 707 (2012), and so the mandate is 
not directly related to the ACA’s cross-subsidies. 
It is possible that the avoidance responses to community rating are more socially destructive than 
responses to a tax, and, if so, this cuts against our argument. For example, Wynand van de Ven and 
Frederik Schut argue that community rating creates perverse incentives for insurers to drive away high- 
cost customers. See WYNAND PMM VAN DE VEN & FREDERIK T. SCHUT, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON 
FOUND., RISK EQUALIZATION IN AN INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET: THE ONLY ESCAPE FROM 
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN AFFORDABILITY, EFFICIENCY AND SELECTION 10–11 (2007). 
288. See Hoffman, supra note 276, at 36–37. 
289. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
290. See id. § 5000A(g). 
291. See Peter Long & Jonathan Gruber, Projecting the Impact of the Affordable Care Act on 
California, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 63, 68 (2011) (estimating the share of individuals subject to mandate 
who would choose no insurance). As of the time of this writing, Congress has repealed the penalties on 
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extent to which the ACA affects any incentive to report income.292 
Finally, although not entirely off-budget, the ACA finances most of its subsidies 
through tax expenditures, which show up in the national budget as tax reductions 
rather than spending increases.293 Moreover, the purchase of the insurance itself is 
by individuals, rather than the government, which also minimizes the nominal 
government cost relative to, say, nationalized health care.294 The pragmatic impor-
tance of these choices should not be understated. Multibillion-dollar transfers 
would be unlikely to survive continuing annual appropriations. Experiences with 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in the 1990s and more recently 
with Medicaid show that even highly entrenched entitlements are targets for raids 
when budgets need balancing.295 Many actors in the health system must make 
long-range plans based on the expectation of subsidies, and the ACA’s more polit-
ically durable structure encourages planners to sink investments with greater confi-
dence that the program will still exist in the future. Although the near-repeal of the 
ACA in 2017296 
See Dylan Scott, The Latest Vote to Repeal Obamacare Fails in the Senate, VOX (July 26, 2017, 
4:15 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/7/26/16034020/senate-health-care-bill-clean- 
obamacare-repeal-fails [https://perma.cc/7MEG-L5SJ]; Seung Min Kim et al., Senate Won’t Vote on 
Last-Ditch Obamacare Repeal Bill, POLITICO (Sept. 26, 2017, 10:20 AM), https://www.politico.com/ 
story/2017/09/26/obamacare-repeal-failure-republican-senate-243148 [https://perma.cc/Q67B-XVSG]. 
suggests potential political fragility, the ACA’s survival showed 
its surprising strength. 
Progressivity offers the strongest objections to ACA cross-subsidies,297 but 
even those objections are modest. Premium hikes represent a relatively flat tax on 
healthier workers.298 
See Josh Barro, Why ‘Rate Shock’ Is an Essential Part of Health Care Reform, BUS. INSIDER 
(Oct. 28, 2013, 1:47 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-rate-shock-is-an-essential-part-of- 
health-reform-2013-10 [https://perma.cc/L7EV-8GXT]. 
This structure is likely less progressive than the overall tax 
system, though if one takes into account payroll taxes—the bulk of which are 
imposed at a flat 12.4 percent rate and capped at $127,200 in wages299
See Contribution and Benefit Base, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/cbb.html 
[https://perma.cc/6TZJ-LYEC]. The payroll tax also includes an uncapped total 2.9 percent Medicare 
payroll tax. Id. 
—the U.S.  
failure to carry insurance, effective for the tax year 2019. Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, § 11081 
(2017). 
292. Some commentators believe these limitations are important to the constitutionality of the 
payments. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of 
the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195, 1241 (2012). 
293. See SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44333, HEALTH-RELATED TAX EXPENDITURES: 
OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS (2016). 
294. See Brooks, supra note 227, at 1068. 
295. See David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in 
the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1299, 1314 (2004) (explaining the role of 
budget raids in differential fates of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and food stamp programs). 
296. 
297. Katherine Baicker & Helen Levy, Employer Health Insurance Mandates and the Risk of 
Unemployment, 11 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 109, 110 (2008); Mark V. Pauly et al., A Plan for 
‘Responsible National Health Insurance,’ 10 HEALTH AFFAIRS 5, 19 (1991); see Gruber, supra note 25, 
at 664 (noting that mandates are “particularly burdensome” for low-wage workers). 
298. 
299. 
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tax system is not as progressive as popularly believed.300 
See Are Federal Taxes Progressive?, TAX POLICY CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
briefing-book/are-federal-taxes-progressive [https://perma.cc/WK6Z-FV8S] (last visited Apr. 10, 2018). 
At the same time, the 
ACA also added a 3.8 percent tax on the net investment income of households 
earning above $250,000, which adds significantly to overall progressivity.301 
T16-0310 - Repeal 3.8 Percent Net Investment Income Tax (NIIT) by Expanded Cash Income 
Percentile, 2017, TAX POLICY CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/ 
distribution-affordable-care-act-taxes-dec-2016/t16-0310-repeal-38-percent-net [https://perma.cc/ 
2YDX-S89J]. 
Further, the ACA’s net transfer to women and the infirm is itself likely progres-
sive relative to a baseline in which there is no ACA.302 Although we would have 
favored a middle-class tax cut to further offset any regressive impact of the ACA, 
we think that, overall, the progressivity critique is minor in comparison to the 
benefits cross-subsidies offer. 
B. FAMILY LEAVE LAWS 
Should governments pay the salaries of individuals who are granted paid fam-
ily leave, or should workers and their employers have to bear those costs? To 
make this question more concrete, we consider the recent paid-leave law enacted 
by the District of Columbia.303 D.C.’s law guarantees paid leave for workers in 
qualifying circumstances. Instead of being paid by employers during this period, 
workers are compensated out of a District-wide fund, which in turn is financed by 
a 0.62 percent payroll tax on D.C. workers.304 Although this structure follows the 
classic public finance prescription to pay benefits out of general tax revenues, we 
think there is much to be said for an alternate cross-subsidy version, previously 
considered and rejected by the District, in which employers would have been 
obligated to pay.305 
Fenit Nirappil, Bowser, Council Chair Spar over D.C. Paid Family Leave: ‘What Is the Secrecy?,’ 
WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/bowser-council-chair-spar- 
over-dc-paid-family-leave-what-is-the-secrecy/2016/10/25/15613068-9ad2-11e6-b3c9-f662adaa0048_story. 
html [https://perma.cc/Z4LU-GXPU]. As of August 2017, some cross-subsidy proposals remained on 
the table as possible revisions to the existing bill. See UPLA v Alternatives, D.C. PAID FAMILY LEAVE 
(Jul. 24, 2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2qt8Qaz_w8BaXNDZmp2VnZtem8/view [https:// 
perma.cc/V6RE-SHKF]. 
The “employer mandate” version of the paid-leave law would have some of 
the same costs as an income or payroll tax. It would reduce the wages of workers, 
driving down their incentives to work, and this disincentive is piled on top of 
existing, high, D.C. income taxes.306 It also likely duplicates an income tax’s 
300. 
301. 
302. Cf. Robert A. Carolina & M. Gregg Bloche, Paying for Undercompensated Hospital Care: The 
Regressive Profile of a “Hidden Tax,” 2 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 158 (1992) (noting that costs of 
uninsured care are passed on to paying health-care customers without respect to ability to pay). 
303. Universal Paid Leave Amendment Act of 2016, D.C. CODE § 32-541 (2017). 
304. Id. § 32-541.03. 
305. 
306. Cf. Jolls, Accommodation, supra note 4, at 246 (describing effects of mandate that preferences 
one group of workers). Because the benefit is not literally dependent on income, it probably will be 
somewhat less distortive of work effort than a true income tax. But because presumably higher-paid 
workers are more expensive to replace and pay while on leave, its impact on salary likely still varies 
with income, making it tax-like. 
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incentives to resort to the informal economy: workers who do not value paid 
leave may prefer to work under the table to earn higher salaries. Nor do manda-
tory leave laws seem to do an especially good job at targeting marginal beneficia-
ries; rather, the effect is to compensate those who would have taken leave 
regardless.307 At the same time, paid leave actually shrinks D.C.’s revenues, 
because it reduces the wages D.C. taxes.308 Thus, the District’s councilmembers 
do not even gain the political advantage of hiding the true cost of paid leave off- 
budget. 
There are two potential off-setting advantages. For one, mandated paid leave 
would have some aspects of a benefit tax. Paid leave would make it easier for 
women (and, increasingly, men) to enter and stay in the workforce, offsetting 
some of the policy’s labor-supply effects.309 Unlike Summers’s version of a bene-
fit tax, this benefit would be paid for only in one jurisdiction, so it could create 
some locational distortions. Employers who would otherwise be indifferent to 
location—and whose workforces would not value the benefit—might shift jobs to 
suburban Virginia and Maryland instead of the District. For the most part, how-
ever, this would be true no matter how D.C. financed its policy, because any tax it 
imposed would be similarly limited to D.C.-connected activities and would there-
fore create similar locational distortions. 
This brings us to the second potential advantage. In some respects, this second 
advantage is unique to D.C., but it illustrates a larger point. Congress prohibits 
the D.C. government from collecting income taxes on individuals who work in 
D.C. but reside elsewhere.310 The paid-leave mandate, in contrast, would have 
reached every employee who worked inside the District.311 In effect, paid leave 
could have allowed D.C. to collect “tax” on workers it could not directly tax.312 
The paid-leave mandate, then, is an illustration of how cross-subsidies can some-
times sidestep arbitrary and inefficient budget constraints that would otherwise 
limit the options open to lawmakers.313 
On balance, it is difficult to say which model—payroll tax and transfer or 
cross-subsidization via employer mandate—is superior. The choice would 
depend on the size of the competing advantages and disadvantages. Our claim on 
307. See Lester, supra note 4, at 18–33 (exploring justifications for paid family leave). 
308. See D.C. CODE § 47-1806 (2017). 
309. See Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 4, at 145. 
310. See District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 
93-198, § 602(a)(5), 87 Stat. 774, 813 (1973); Banner v. United States, 428 F.3d 303, 312 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (upholding this provision against constitutional challenges from D.C. city councilmembers). 
311. See Miossi & Phillips, supra note 102. 
312. See Id. (funding through payroll tax on all covered D.C. employers); supra note 180 and 
accompanying text (redistribution of cost of mandate applicable to only a subgroup akin to “tax”); cf. 
supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text (employees “taxed” where employer offsets the cost of the 
mandated benefit by lowering employees’ wages). 
313. We claim that the tax limit is inefficient because it motivates workers to live in the suburbs, 
without any obvious offsetting policy gain. Notably, D.C. residents do not have a voting representative 
in the body—Congress—that imposed the limit. 
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this front is simply that it is not obvious, as critics contend, that the mandate 
approach was the worse choice. 
According to published reports, D.C. ultimately chose a publicly-financed tax- 
and-transfer system not for any of these reasons, but for one of the “practical” 
design issues we mentioned in section III.E.314 
See Emily Crockett, Washington, DC, Passed One of the Nation’s Most Generous Paid Family 
Leave Laws, VOX (Dec. 22, 2016, 11:59 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/12/22/14038812/ 
washington-dc-paid-family-leave-trump-blue-states [https://perma.cc/3LBY-NHRG]. 
An employer mandate would have 
limited benefits to those who worked in multi-employee workplaces. By choosing 
public financing, D.C. was also able to extend benefits to those who are self- 
employed or work in one-worker offices.315 
Press Release: Reactions to Business Lobby Proposal for Employer Mandate of Paid Leave, 
DC PAID FAMILY LEAVE (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.dcpaidfamilyleave.org/updates/2016/10/28/press- 
release-paid-family-leave-coalition-reaction-to-employer-mandate-proposal [https://perma.cc/XNJ4- 
6C3F]. Advocates also argue that an “employer mandate” model would more strongly incentivize 
employers to undermine the program. See D.C. PAID FAMILY LEAVE, PROTECTING THE UNIVERSAL 
PAID FAMILY LEAVE ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/ 
0B2qt8Qaz_w8BcmJRSlliR1llWVE/view [https://perma.cc/H9QA-C9SV]. 
In the end, this advantage apparently 
outweighed, for D.C. legislators, any gains from the alternative design. We would 
note, though, that the District could likely have had the best of both worlds if it 
had retained its original idea but added a small payroll tax sufficient to pay for the 
self-employed. 
C. PRODUCTS LIABILITY TORTS 
As we saw earlier, the tort system obliges consumers to bear a portion of the 
cost of injuries caused by consumer products, and these costs are difficult for con-
sumers and manufacturers to redirect. In other contexts, governments have 
funded the costs of injuries directly out of general revenues. New Zealand pays 
for auto injuries this way,316 whereas in the United States, we have used taxpayer- 
financed victim compensation funds in a few high-profile instances.317 
We agree with Logue and Avraham that at least a portion of the cost of acci-
dents should be borne by consumers as a class, rather than paid for with public 
funds.318 Logue and Avraham mainly argue for using the tort system to redistrib-
ute on the basis of wealth;319 we take no view on that question, but their analysis 
314. 
315. 
316. Schuck, supra note 18, at 190. New Zealand does not currently compensate for most pain and 
suffering claims, however. Id. at 196. 
317. See Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Funds and the Election of Remedies: The Need for Informed 
Consent, 31 REV. LITIG. 833, 834–35 (2012). 
318. See Logue & Avraham, supra note 4, at 227–28. To be clear, to achieve an optimal level of 
precaution, even proponents of pure public financing would require individual injured parties to bear 
some of their own costs. Our analysis instead focuses on the share of costs borne by consumers overall. 
We should also note that increases in consumer costs due to the deterrent effect of torts is, for the most 
part, efficient, at least for products whose dangers are not fully observable by consumers. See Polinsky 
& Shavell, supra note 90, at 1459; see also Hylton, supra note 92, at 2476–77. What we analyze here is 
the additional cost imposed on low-risk consumers to finance compensation for injuries to high-risk 
purchasers. Hylton, supra note 92, at 2483–84. 
319. Logue & Avraham, supra note 4, at 252. 
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also supports compensating victims for their pain and suffering through cross- 
subsidies.320 
Although we would quibble with some of the particulars of their argument, we 
share their bottom-line assessment that tort cross-subsidies would not create 
“double distortion.”321 Few behaviors that minimize the income tax would also 
reduce the costs consumers pay into the tort system, or vice-versa.322 Tort’s 
implicit insurance pool would also extract surplus from some inframarginal pur-
chasers, although this would be offset in part because, contrary to Summers’s 
assumption, it differentially burdens products with varying risk levels. On the 
other hand, the tort system is expensive to administer,323 although because we 
likely would still have some mechanism for detecting and punishing injuries even 
under a tax-and-transfer model, it is unlikely that the incremental costs of using 
the tort system for compensation are large. 
Our analysis also suggests that the current tax treatment of tort awards may be 
too generous. Again, by excluding most tort awards from the injured person’s 
income, among other benefits, the government in effect pays a share of the 
award.324 If it is more efficient, up to a point, to finance accidents through a cross- 
subsidy, it is hard to justify a taxpayer contribution of 40 percent or more. 
Furthermore, to the extent that tortfeasors capture a portion of taxpayers’ contri-
butions, as they likely do, this structure may violate the “polluter pays” principle, 
or at least may set the injurer’s “co-pay” at lower than the optimal level.325 In 
addition, the government’s share of payments depends on the victim’s tax rate, a 
factor that is unrelated to any part of our efficiency analysis. If the government is 
going to contribute a fraction of tort award costs, it should do so through a credit 
that does not vary by tax bracket. 
One last note about geography. So far we have assumed a nationwide tort sys-
tem, but in practice, much tort law is made state-by-state. States should prefer to 
finance a larger share of consumer protection through cross-subsidies than the 
320. See id. at 249–50. 
321. See id. at 189. Specifically, we disagree with the claim Logue and Avraham make about why 
tort does not create a double distortion. See id. at 188–91. They suggest tort claims are not “correlated 
with” labor effort because a tortfeasor can respond to a potential tort judgment by reducing the amount 
of tortious activity it engages in—or, presumably, customers can switch away from products with high 
implicit insurance premiums. See id. Both of these responses, however, would distort labor supply under 
a standard Atkinson–Stiglitz analysis: either way, the individual is changing her behavior away from 
what she preferred absent tort liability. By definition, her preferences are no longer as fully satisfied; she 
is no longer getting as much value for her wages, reducing her incentive to work. Our analysis avoids 
this problem because it depends on tax avoidance behavior, not just labor supply. 
322. This might not be true of a tax system that relied mostly on sales taxes, because black market 
transactions presumably would eliminate both the sales tax and the likelihood that the seller could be 
brought to trial. 
323. Hylton, supra note 92, at 2480–81; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 90, at 1470. 
324. See Dodge, supra note 94, at 143. The Tax Code also allows settling parties to escape tax on 
investment returns nested within a “structured settlement,” I.R.C. § 104, an unjustified subsidy in most 
cases. See Dodge, supra note 94, at 159–60. 
325. Cf. Dodge, supra note 94, at 173–74, 174 n.150 (noting that tax subsidies for defendants may 
encourage tortious conduct). 
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federal government would—for instance, states might tax tort awards even if 
awards were federally exempt. State tax systems are less efficient than federal 
taxes, in part because it is usually easier for taxpayers to shift money across bor-
ders.326 Tort liability overlaps with the sales tax, on which many states depend,327 
See URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., STATE AND LOCAL GENERAL REVENUE 2004–2013 
(2015), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/dqs_table_64.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XWM- 
5HEG] (listing states’ annual revenue sources and revealing, in most states, a substantial portion is sales 
tax). 
which might cut against cross-subsidies. But due to some foibles of federal dor-
mant commerce clause jurisprudence, tort liability is distinct from sales taxes in 
important ways: it is hard for a merchant to sell into a state without also being 
subject to tort liability there, whereas it is relatively easy for the same merchant 
to escape the state’s taxes on the sale of and profits from its product.328 States also 
face artificial budget constraints, such as balanced-budget rules, that might pre-
clude on-budget insurance for injured consumers.329 
D. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
Who should pay for innovation: governments or consumers? As with torts, our 
answer is “probably both.” Like the right to sue, patent protection, in effect, 
imposes a sales tax on patented products but not others.330 Pointing in favor of 
patents, however, they are often in part benefit taxes.331 Further, they typically 
have little obvious interaction with the income tax, suggesting that social costs 
due to avoidance of patents is far smaller than would be caused by comparable 
funding through the income tax.332 Thus, there can be substantial savings by rely-
ing on patents rather than taxpayer dollars, assuming that these savings in the 
aggregate are large enough to pay for the (not trivial) cost of the patent adminis-
tration system.333 
Again, however, there are limits to this argument. Patents distort economic ac-
tivity on many margins. For some products, such distortion can become more 
326. For discussion, see Brooks, supra note 241, at 111–20; Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, 
Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal 
Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 187, 195–98 (2010). 
327. 
328. See generally Brian Galle, Symposium, Is Local Consumer Protection Law a Better 
Redistributive Mechanism than the Tax System?, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525, 530–40 (2010). 
329. See Galle & Klick, supra note 326, at 203. 
330. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 
1693, 1713 (2008); see also Paul Romer, When Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights?, 92 AM. 
ECON. REV. 213, 215 (2002) (discussing the same features within copyright). Substitutes for the patented 
product may also rise in price if consumers switch to them. Although the possibility that intellectual 
property holders might charge customers differing prices depending on individual demand would 
mitigate a great deal of deadweight loss, most commentators believe that such possibility is mostly 
impractical. See, e.g., SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 37 (2004). 
331. Stiglitz, supra note 330, at 1713. 
332. The largest overlap we can think of is the possibility that knock-off products are likely to be 
traded in the cash economy. 
333. Cf. Stiglitz, supra note 330, at 1715–16 (discussing costs of IP administration in the United 
States). 
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burdensome than the marginal cost of raising public funds.334 Distortion will be 
an especially acute burden if only a small group of consumers pays the premium. 
Certain products with intellectual property (IP) protections could fall within 
other exceptions to the Atkinson–Stiglitz framework. For example, IP protections 
might impose an efficient sales tax on leisure complements. Recent evidence that 
video games reduce male workforce participation offers a tidbit of empirical sup-
port on this front.335 
See Mark Aguiar et al., Leisure Luxuries and the Labor Supply of Young Men 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23552, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23552.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3Y9Q-Q54P]. Once video games are no longer IP protected, gamers would be receiving a 
subsidy, but few games remain popular that long. 
At the same time, IP also imposes “taxes” on many products 
that enhance productivity, ranging from the exotic, such as drugs that aid concen-
tration, to the mundane, like the automobile. These are especially undesirable in 
the Atkinson–Stiglitz analysis.336 
IP also has distributive effects.337 Consumers of some IP-protected goods may 
be relatively poor, so switching to taxpayer financing would result in greater 
overall progressivity.338 We would add that the cross-temporal nature of IP cross- 
subsidies implies that the present is paying for the future’s benefits. Based on his-
torical trends, economists expect future taxpayers to be much wealthier than we 
are.339 Just as many bridges are built with bond revenues, IP law might therefore 
justify deficit-financed tax cuts in the present; in effect, we would be borrowing 
against the future surplus our IP payments are providing to later generations.340 
The political economy of IP is also a mixed bag. On the one hand, the gov-
ernment may have difficulty credibly committing to pay an ex post award to 
inventors—especially those who will take many years to bring their product to 
market. A tax-funded ex post grant program might have its funding stripped ten 
years into a drug or solar-panel development process, and this possibility 
would discourage some innovators and increase the costs of obtaining outside  
334. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 113, at 54–55; cf. Paul L. Joskow, Regulation of Natural 
Monopoly, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1227, 1251 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell eds., 2007) (explaining that deadweight loss of taxation can be greater or less than the social cost 
of monopoly). 
335. 
336. Once more, those who purchase after IP protection lapses would be subsidized, which is, here, a 
desirable result. It is possible these later gains would outweigh the earlier losses, depending on how long 
generic products and the like remain useful. Taking into account the time value of money, however, 
future gains would have to be considerably larger to outweigh up-front losses. See David Weisbach & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 433, 438–40 (2009) (discussing rationale for time discounting in government planning). 
337. Stiglitz, supra note 330, at 1714–15. 
338. See id. at 1716. 
339. See Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 336, at 440–41. For more in-depth discussion of 
approaches to intergenerational justice, see Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children’s Children’s 
Children: The Problems of Intergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163, 169–224 (2001). 
340. See Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 
1141 (suggesting that debt-financed infrastructure assigns obligation to pay to those who will benefit in 
the future). 
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financing for others.341 Because patents are off-budget, they offer a more reliable 
promise of future funding. 
On the other hand, the opacity of IP subsidies seems to have contributed to 
some abuses.342 Infamously, Congress retroactively extended the duration of 
copyright protections, caving to pressure from powerful existing rights holders.343 
If the social costs of longer monopolies had been estimated in dollars and been 
subject to appropriations, the giveaway might well have failed. Congress also 
uses short-duration patents as a form of incentive, such as in the Hatch-Waxman 
Act scheme of awarding temporary monopolies to generic drug manufacturers 
who successfully challenge an existing pharmaceutical patent.344 Absent budget-
ing reforms, we predict more such bills as substitutes for targeted government 
support.345 Congress’s budget process systematically favors monopoly awards. 
The costs of the monopoly go uncounted, but the revenue benefits from decreased 
government expenditures on newly unpatented drugs are fully credited. 
Overall, the relative efficiency of IP versus taxpayer financing is uncertain and 
may vary from product to product. These factors may be difficult to predict before 
a product is on the market,346 but once better information develops, it might 
become clear that the government should switch regimes, swapping out tax reve-
nues for patent protection. That could be accomplished, among other routes, by 
the government negotiating to buy the IP or by condemning it and paying “fair 
value.”347 Condemnation is rare but should be on the table when the deadweight 
loss of patents is clearly greater than the marginal cost of public funds, when the 
patent is burdening some product that greatly enhances productivity, or when the 
distributive impact of the patent is great.348 
341. See Joskow, supra note 334, at 1255 (discussing the potential for the regulator to hold up the 
entrepreneur with sunk costs). 
342. See Romer, supra note 330, at 216. 
343. See generally Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 413–22 
(2002) (describing the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act). 
344. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1585. See generally C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1565–67, 1605–07 (2006) (describing and 
analyzing the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
345. See, e.g., Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa–360dd (2000) (granting seven-year exclusive 
window for treatments for certain rare diseases); 21 U.S.C. § 355a (2000) (adding six-month patent 
protection to pharmaceutical makers who test products for pediatric use). 
346. Cf. Roin, supra note 117, at 1053 (arguing that the government needs to observe consumer 
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CONCLUSION 
Cross-subsidies are an underrecognized and underexamined policy mecha-
nism. They appear far more often—and in far more settings—than virtually all 
observers have acknowledged. We think this is in part because their theoretical 
justifications are meaningfully broader than the traditional treatments suggest. 
Our contribution is thus twofold. We identified the stubborn frequency with 
which cross-subsidies appear, in substantive policy areas that otherwise have noth-
ing to do with one another. When a particular species of policy colonizes many 
fields, that is noteworthy in itself. We are confident that more cross-subsidies exist 
in the wild than we discuss here; many readers will no doubt find them in places 
we did not consider. 
Our account, however, is more than anthropological. Although cross-subsidies 
do come with important limitations, current scholarly consideration of their posi-
tives and negatives is incomplete. In this Article, we have also fleshed out a 
theory of cross-subsidy utility that does not deny the limits of the cross-subsidy 
as a policy tool, but instead more carefully explicates the contours of those limits. 
We suggest that cross-subsidies might be the right regulatory choice more fre-
quently than has been previously assumed.  
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